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S A R A H  A .  S E O  
Democratic Policing Before the Due Process 
Revolution 
abstract.  According to prevailing interpretations of the Warren Court’s Due Process Revo-
lution, the Supreme Court constitutionalized criminal procedure to constrain the discretion of in-
dividual officers. These narratives, however, fail to account for the Court’s decisions during that 
revolutionary period that enabled discretionary policing. Instead of beginning with the Warren 
Court, this Essay looks to the legal culture before the Due Process Revolution to provide a more 
coherent synthesis of the Court’s criminal procedure decisions. It reconstructs that culture by an-
alyzing the prominent criminal law scholar Jerome Hall’s public lectures, Police and Law in a Dem-
ocratic Society, which he delivered in 1952 on the differences between democratic and totalitarian 
police forces. Hall’s deﬁnition of democratic policing appealed to self-rule, then to the rule of law, 
and ﬁnally, to due process, as he struggled to account for twentieth-century police forces that were 
not, in important ways, governed by the people or entirely constrained by law. Hall ultimately 
settled on the idea that in a democratic society due process meant that the police did not decide the 
outcome of a “fair trial”—a deﬁnition that is different from today’s understanding of due process, 
which emphasizes judicial review of police action. The Essay applies the methodology of cultural 
history to argue that during the Cold War, Hall articulated a concept of due process that was not 
just a legal norm but also a cultural value that rationalized discretionary policing and served to 
distinguish two competing systems of government that both relied on discretionary authority. The 
Essay concludes by exploring how Hall’s explication of due process, which was representative of 
midcentury views, might revise standard accounts of the Due Process Revolution. Understanding 
the legal culture that came before—and informed—the Warren Court’s criminal procedure deci-
sions suggests that due process functioned as much to justify as to restrain police discretion. 
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Yet even the ordinary human mind is quite capable of recognizing both 
that an ideal has no objective truth and yet that it does have emotional 
value. For example, note the display of joy and sadness at football games 
indulged in by alumni who well know that nothing of importance is at 
stake; note the necessity of the presence of an admittedly non-existent 
Santa Claus at Christmas; note the English attitude toward their king. 
Most churches today have achieved that attitude toward their creeds. Re-
alistic understanding of an ideal does not necessarily destroy it. In the end 
it may make the ideal even more vital by restricting it to the purposes for 
which it has value. 




In July 1952, Jerome Hall, a prominent legal scholar at Indiana University, 
gave three public lectures collectively titled Police and Law in a Democratic Society 
at the University of Chicago Law School.
2
 To illustrate his understanding of 
democratic values in the police context, Hall rendered a conceptual ﬂowchart. 
He began with the constitutional provision of due process, which imputed legal-
ity to statutes enacted under it. Those statutes, in turn, gave legitimacy to rules 
and standards set forth in judicial decisions. The rule of law then manifested in 
the police officer who acted pursuant to those rules and standards. The 
ﬂowchart, however, did not conclude with the officer’s mechanical enforcement 
of the laws. Ultimately, the officer, through such enforcement, turned into an 
abstraction: “the living embodiment of the law,” “the concrete distillation of the 
entire mighty, historic corpus juris,” “the living expression of democratic law.”
3
 
Hall’s ﬁgurative language seems remarkable today, coming from a self-professed 
“rule of law person” and conservative critic of the discretionary powers of ad-
ministrative bureaucrats.
4
 Within a single lecture and with the facility of meta-
phor, Hall cloaked the most discretion-wielding, law-enforcing arm of the twen-
tieth-century state with the legitimacy of law. 
 
1. Thurman W. Arnold, Law Enforcement—An Attempt at Social Dissection, 42 YALE L.J. 1, 6 
(1932). 
2. The lectures were published the following year. See Jerome Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic 
Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133 (1953). 
3. Id. at 144. 
4. Letter from Jerome Hall, Professor, Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of Law, to Hans Zeisel, Pro-
fessor Emeritus, Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. (July 9, 1981) (on ﬁle with the University of Califor-
nia Hastings Law Library Special Collections, Jerome Hall Papers, Box 2, Folder “Correspond-
ence Z” [hereinafter Jerome Hall Papers]). 
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* * * 
The dominant narrative of the Warren Court’s Due Process Revolution is 
one of rupture, captured in the word revolution itself. In this account, the Court 
broke new ground by extending federal procedural rights to state criminal de-
fendants in an effort to protect individuals, especially minorities and the poor, 
from the police. Most histories of twentieth-century criminal procedure have 
adopted this paradigm of social conﬂict.
5
 The ﬂourishing of rights, we have 
learned, emerged from an enduring struggle between the forces of security and 
advocates of liberty, with the Supreme Court leading the charge to police the 
police under the banner of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
Today’s understanding of due process accordingly centers on judicial oversight 
of policing. Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares, for example, have deﬁned the “mod-
ern criminal procedure regime” as the body of constitutional doctrines that seeks 




Yet several inconsistencies complicate this story of active and progressive ju-
dicial review of police discretion. One is Yale Kamisar’s observation that “[t]he 
Warren Court’s performance in the ﬁeld of criminal procedure does not fall into 
neat categories.”
7
 In Kamisar’s assessment, during the “closing years of the War-
ren Court Era,” when the Revolution had already ended, the “defense did win 
some victories.”
8
 The defense also “lost some important cases earlier, when the 
 
5. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 216-18 (2011); 
SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8, 180 (2d 
ed. 1998); Michael Willrich, Criminal Justice in the United States, in 3 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF 
LAW IN AMERICA 198, 217-18 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008). Encap-
sulating this dualistic way of thinking, Stanford law professor Herbert Packer’s famous article 
Two Models of the Criminal Process, ﬁrst published in 1964, aptly consisted of the “Crime Con-
trol Model” and the “Due Process Model.” Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Pro-
cess, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1964). Most law professors accepted Packer’s binary framework 
as a truth claim. For example, when assistant professor John Griffiths sought “to illustrate 
that our present assumptions” underlying the two models were “not the inevitable truths they 
often seem to be” by proposing a third “family model” (this was the 1960s), Yale Law School 
denied him tenure. John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third “Model” of the Crim-
inal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359, 359-60 (1970); see LAURA KALMAN, YALE LAW SCHOOL AND THE 
SIXTIES: REVOLT AND REVERBERATIONS 245-55 (2005). 
6. Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. 
L.J. 1153, 1158-59 (1998). 
7. Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, 31 TULSA 
L.J. 1, 4 (1995); see also Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of 
the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1344-45 (1977) (citing Warren Court decisions that 
expanded police authority). 
8. Kamisar, supra note 7, at 4, 6. 
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revolution in criminal procedure was supposed to be at its peak.”
9
 Second, while 
many of the Warren Court’s landmark decisions provoked prompt backlash—
consistent with the narrative of opposition—one of its most prominent cases, 
Gideon v. Wainwright,
10
 received immediate and widespread approval.
11
 Third, 
the subsequent, more conservative Burger Court invalidated vagrancy laws in 
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville
12
 for granting too much discretion to the police 
and, in doing so, articulated a breathtakingly broad understanding of personal 
liberty. Rather than proving the rule, all of these exceptions suggest that a gen-
eral theory built on a dichotomy between due process and crime control fails to 
provide a fully coherent view of the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure deci-
sions. 
* * * 
One could dismiss Jerome Hall’s striking description of the police as the em-
bodiment of democratic values and the rule of law as mere metaphor, political 
spin, or cognitive dissonance. But it is more difficult to ignore the fact that the 
Chicago lectures received attention from both the general public and legal schol-
ars, including Herbert Wechsler.
13
 Although now somewhat obscure, Hall was a 
Distinguished Professor of Law at Indiana University from 1957 to 1970, and in 
recognition of his stature, the Maurer School of Law named its library and a 
postdoctoral fellowship in his honor. In 1966, a New York Times book review 
essay identiﬁed him as among the “American judges, lawyers and teachers of 
law . . . who made contributions to legal philosophy and jurisprudence.”
14
 He 
was a leader in several disciplines, serving as President of the American Society 
for Political and Legal Philosophy (1967-1969), President of the American Sec-
 
9. Id. at 4. 
10. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
11. See, e.g., ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 206-07 (1964); Shows to Watch, TIMES REC-
ORD, Oct. 3, 1964, at 31 (recommending a show on the “remarkable story of a Florida convict 
who changed the structure of the American legal system and opened the prison doors for more 
than a thousand men”). 
12. 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
13. See Letter from Herbert Wechsler, Professor, Columbia Univ., to Jerome Hall, Professor, Univ. 
of Ind. Sch. of Law (Mar. 10, 1953) (on ﬁle with Jerome Hall Papers, Box 2, Folder “Corre-
spondence W”) (“Could we get eight or ten reprints [of Hall’s Chicago lectures] for our li-
brary?”); Report on the First Chicago Lecture, HYDE PARK HERALD, July 23, 1952 (on ﬁle with 
Jerome Hall Papers, scrapbook); cf. DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 44 
(2008) (discussing “Jerome Hall’s inﬂuential article of 1953”). 
14. Milton R. Konvitz, Democracy and the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1966, at 18 (including Hall 
in a list with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, John Chipman 
Gray, Roscoe Pound, Jerome Frank, Thurman Arnold, Felix S. Cohen, Karl Llewellyn, Max 
Radin, and Lon L. Fuller). 
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tion of the International Association for Legal and Social Philosophy (1966-
1968), and Director of the American Society for Legal History.
15
 Once he retired 
from Indiana, U.C. Hastings College of Law immediately hired him into the dis-
tinguished “65 Club.”
16
 This peculiar tradition took advantage of mandatory re-
tirement rules then in place at many law schools by recruiting prominent schol-
ars and jurists over the age of sixty-ﬁve, including the Chief Justice of California 
Roger Traynor, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, and the torts 
scholar William Prosser.
17
 This assembly of star power prompted Roscoe Pound 
to declare that Hastings had “the strongest law faculty in the nation.”
18
 Accord-
ing to Hall’s New York Times obituary, he continued to teach until about six years 
before his death at age ninety-one.
19
 
By the time he delivered his Chicago lectures in 1952, Hall had established an 
international reputation as a leading scholar of criminal law and legal philoso-
phy. The major works for which he was known—including General Principles of 
Criminal Law, which the Journal of Legal Education described as “the most im-





 (In 1960, his publisher would increase his royalties for 
a second edition of General Principles from ﬁfteen to twenty percent because 
“Professor Hall is the mos[t] ou[t]standing Criminal Law writer of the twenti-
eth Century.”
22
) Hall had also written on democratic theory, having published 
Living Law of Democratic Society in 1949. Based on his scrapbook, Hall began re-
ceiving invitations to give talks on the topic in 1947, and his 1952 lectures appear 
to have been part of this speaking tour. Two years later, in 1954, the U.S. State 
Department asked him to assist with the “legal reconstruction” of South Korea 
 
15. Faculty Focus: Professor Jerome Hall, HASTINGS ALUMNI BULL., Sept. 1972, at 11 (on ﬁle with 
Jerome Hall Papers, Box 2, Folder “Biographical Data Announcements”). 
16. Eric Jaye, Professor: 85 and Still on His Toes, RECORDER, Mar. 3, 1986, at 1; Wolfgang Saxon, 
Jerome Hall, 91, Legal Scholar Who Was Professor and Author, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 1992), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/11/us/jerome-hall-91-legal-scholar-who-was-professor
-and-author.html [https://perma.cc/TDU6-WSU8]; see also The 65 Club: A Legacy of Distin-
guished Scholarship, U.C. HASTINGS MAG. (Oct. 3, 2013), https://web.archive.org/web
/20160419112241/https://uchastings.edu/news/articles/2013/10/65-club-magazine.php 
[https://perma.cc/8B8U-RFTE]. 
17. The 65 Club, supra note 16. 
18. Id. 
19. Saxon, supra note 16. 
20. Fred Cohen, Criminal Law Legislation and Legal Scholarship, 16 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253, 260 (1964). 
21. Much Honored Professor Ranked Superior as Law Instructor and Scholar, YOUR U., Jan. 1965, at 
3, 4 (on ﬁle with Jerome Hall Papers, Box 12, Folder “photographs”). 
22. Memorandum from Walter A. Cornell to Leo Gobin (Jan. 8, 1960) (on ﬁle with Jerome Hall 
Papers, Box 2, Folder “Biographical Data Announcements”). 
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after the war there.
23
 Given Hall’s reputation as a criminal law scholar and dem-
ocratic advisor and theorist, Police and Law in a Democratic Society received seri-
ous attention. 
Hall’s exposition of democratic policing may be perplexing to us today, but 
it made sense to him and to his audience. Taking Hall on his own terms, rather 
than writing off the lectures as a curious relic, might offer a starting point for a 
cultural history of fundamental principles in American law—and could help to 
explain tensions within the Due Process Revolution. This approach may suggest 
insights altogether different from those of traditional legal studies. The pages of 
a judicial opinion, a casebook, or a professor’s lecture provide a ﬁrst-order de-
scription of, say, due process, to take the example from Hall’s illustration above. 
They address the legal meanings of due process, such as the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel. To be sure, these rights are important in the real world; the 
point at which an accused has the right to consult a lawyer can make all the dif-
ference in a case. The main point here is that the internal view of law—the very 
stuff of law school curricula—centers on legal reasoning and argument. 
But there is also a second-order inquiry, which explores the symbolic meaning 
of legal norms within a particular culture. Thinking about law as culture raises 
different questions than the legal inquiry of which procedural rights are due or 
the normative inquiry of which rights should be due. Instead, it asks what values 
those rights signiﬁed beyond the debates of lawyers and what purpose those val-
ues served. This Essay examines Hall’s lectures at this interpretive level, as an 
artifact reﬂecting American legal culture in the mid-twentieth century, and then 




Of course, culture is amenable to many deﬁnitions, especially among anthro-
pologists. This Essay adopts the understanding memorably stated by Clifford 
Geertz, that “man is an animal suspended in webs of signiﬁcance he himself has 
spun,” and that culture refers to those webs.
25
 To get at these questions of mean-
ing, Geertz proposed “sorting out the structures of signiﬁcation . . . and deter-
 
23. Faculty Focus: Professor Jerome Hall, supra note 15, at 11. 
24. Most accounts of the Warren Court compare it with the succeeding Burger Court, see, e.g., 
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND THE RISE OF THE JUDICIAL 
RIGHT (2016); THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T (Vincent 
Blasi ed., 1983); Cary Franklin, The New Class Blindness, 128 YALE L.J. 2 (2018), but we can 
also gauge its legacy by comparing it with what came before. 
25. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE INTER-
PRETATION OF CULTURES 3, 5 (1973). I approach culture as a system of meaning. Other legal 
scholars have adopted a different conception of culture as social structure, that is, the relation-
ship between individuals and groups. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social 
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mining their social ground and import,” a process more simply known as “thick 
description.”
26
 In even plainer language, the cultural anthropologist describes 
behavior in context, distinguishing—to use Geertz’s example—an involuntary 
twitch of the eye from a ﬂirtatious signal or a parody of an amateur’s ﬁrst attempt 
at a wink. Only by absorbing a community’s “socially established code,”
27
 usu-
ally assumed and unstated, can the researcher properly interpret a physical 




Historians have borrowed from the anthropologists’ toolkit to study the 
past, whose culture can be just as foreign. Evoking Geertz, Robert Darnton 
wrote that “[w]hen we cannot get a proverb, or a joke, or a ritual, or a poem, we 
know we are on to something. By picking at the document where it is most 
opaque, we may be able to unravel an alien system of meaning.”
29
 Because his-
torians cannot physically immerse themselves in a different historical period, 
they look beyond traditional textual sources to glean as much as they can about 
a past culture. For instance, when Darnton read about an incident in late 1730s 
Paris involving several printing apprentices who brutally maimed every cat they 
could ﬁnd, which they then reenacted as burlesque at least twenty times in as 
many days, he looked far and wide for more evidence of the torture of animals, 
especially cats, in an effort to understand their joke. After consulting folklores as 
well as popular ceremonies and literature, Darnton discovered that the “great cat 
massacre” was actually a labor protest that, astonishingly, occurred at a time that 




Darnton’s method for explaining eighteenth-century French apprentices’ 
delight in killing cats can be as illuminating when applied to legal history, for 
law offers a rich source for ﬁnding cultural values—the “webs of signiﬁcance” 
 
Movement Conﬂict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
1323, 1325 (2006) (deﬁning constitutional culture to be what guides “interactions among citi-
zens and officials in matters concerning the Constitution’s meaning”). 
26. GEERTZ, supra note 25, at 9-10. 
27. Id. at 6. 
28. Cf. Commonwealth v. Holden, 134 A.2d 868, 872 (Pa. 1957) (“It will be noted that the stupen-
dous and compendious wink not only solicited the fabrication of a spurious alibi but speciﬁed 
that it was ‘to cover up some of his actions.’ One movement of the eyelid conveyed a message 
of 21 words. Not even the most abbreviated Morse code could say so much with such little 
expenditure of muscular and mechanical power.”). 
29. ROBERT DARNTON, THE GREAT CAT MASSACRE AND OTHER EPISODES IN FRENCH CULTURAL 
HISTORY 5 (1984). 
30. Id. at 75-104. 




 In twentieth-century America especially, law existed every-
where, not just in courtrooms or the halls of legislatures. As Christopher Tom-
lins has pointed out, “law [was] the paradigmatic discourse explaining life in 
America, the principal source of life’s ‘facts.’”
32
 While Paul Kahn has emphasized 
how law forms communities and informs identity, the converse is also true—the 
motivation to understand the self and one’s community in the world often ﬁnds 
expression in law.
33
 Twentieth-century Americans often used law to make sense 
of their everyday life and to give it meaning; this Essay examines one academic’s 
efforts.
34
 Hall’s portrayal of policing as the manifestation of the rule of law may 
be downright baffling today—like Darnton’s cat killers, if you will—but we can 
use the methodology of cultural history to decipher its meaning and signiﬁcance. 
Hall makes for an ideal subject for a cultural study of law because he was, in 
important ways, both singular and representative of his generation’s views on 
policing. He was singular in that most elite law professors of his time focused on 
the study of administrative and judicial discretion, not police discretion.
35
 Cer-
tainly, many mid-twentieth-century jurists, academics, and reformers wrote 
about the problem of police lawlessness.
36
 But lawlessness is a concept distinct 
from discretion, and midcentury writers were relatively, and remarkably, silent 
on the latter. Even Hall did not directly discuss discretionary policing in his lec-
tures. Nevertheless, no other scholar, lawyer, or judge—certainly no one of Hall’s 
caliber—tried to spell out how the police function accorded with democratic 
principles to the extent that Hall did.  The lectures thus offer a rare source for 
 
31. See LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE, at xii (2006) (“[L]aw [is] constituted by culture, 
and culture (in no small way) by law.”). 
32. CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 21 
(1993). Tomlins pinpoints the start of this “law’s revolution,” id., to sometime between the 
American Revolution and the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
33. See PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW 9 (1999) (“[T]he function law performs is 
constitutive as well as regulatory.”). 
34. See ROSEN, supra note 31, at 4 (“In short, we create our experience, knit together disparate 
ideas and actions, and in the process fabricate a world of meaning that appears to us as real. 
Law is one of these cultural domains.”); id. at 7 (“[N]owhere is law . . . without its place 
within a system that gives meaning to its people’s life.”); Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35, 37 (2001) (deﬁning culture “as a set of shared signifying practices that 
are always in the making and always up for grabs”). 
35. See Geoffrey C. Shaw, H.L.A. Hart’s Lost Essay: Discretion and the Legal Process School, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 666, 697 (2013) (observing that process theorists focused on the role of 
judges). 
36. See Sam Bass Warner, Investigating the Law of Arrest, 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
111 (1940); Paula R. Markowitz & Walter I. Summerﬁeld, Jr., Note, Philadelphia Police Practice 
and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1952); see infra notes 63-65 and accompanying 
text. 
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gleaning how a legal theorist thought about policing in a democratic society. At 
the same time, Hall was representative in that his ideas fell within the main-
stream in an age of consensus.
37
 He did not unsettle respectable notions about 
police in American society; rather, his lectures mirrored sentiments expressed in 
judicial opinions and popular presses on the need for robust policing. No one 
called him out on what we can recognize today as an astounding articulation of 
police as the embodiment of the rule of law. The value of Hall’s lectures lies pre-
cisely in his recording of a shared way of thinking that was largely assumed and 
thus unstated—a way of thinking that we have nearly forgotten today. 
To recover this past, to understand why Hall viewed police as “the living ex-
pression of democratic law” and what he meant by it, this Essay ﬁrst reconstructs 
the progression of Hall’s thinking, which does not follow his own organization 
of the lectures. He began by advancing his theory of democratic policing in the 
ﬁrst lecture, and then in the second and third lectures applied that theory to the 
police’s role in preventing crime and in upholding civil liberties, respectively. 
This Essay instead limns the conceptual shifts throughout the lectures in order 
to highlight the tensions in Hall’s explanation of how American police con-
formed to democratic values—tensions that did not appear to Hall but are strik-
ing to us today. The main purpose of the ﬁrst three Parts of this Essay is to high-
light how Hall’s thinking is as alien to twenty-ﬁrst-century readers as the 
reenactment of a cat massacre.  
Part I begins with Hall’s attempt to reconcile professionalized, twentieth-
century American police forces with the traditional democratic principle of self-
government, which would have mandated “self-policing.” Unable to do so, Hall 
twice changed his deﬁnition of democratic policing, without realizing, or at least 
without noting, that the various deﬁnitions contained different ideas. Part II ex-
amines the ﬁrst modiﬁcation, that of democratic police as bound by the rule of 
law, which Hall described as an antidiscretion norm. But his efforts to character-
ize police officers as mere law enforcers who did not exercise discretion stretched 
his own understanding of the laws. He dealt with that conﬂict not head on, but, 
as Part III shows, with a second modiﬁcation, that of the rule of law as due pro-
cess. Hall did not think of due process in the police context as we do today; while 
we emphasize judicial review of police discretion, Hall focused on a “fair trial” 
that served to separate judicial and police functions. Although this idea of due 
process did not always ensure that officers would conform to the law, its ob-
servance, even if pro forma, sufficiently satisﬁed Hall. In short, democratic po-
licing ultimately meant that the police did not adjudicate cases. 
 
37. On this consensus, see, for example, WENDY L. WALL, INVENTING THE “AMERICAN WAY”: THE 
POLITICS OF CONSENSUS FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2008). 
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Building on this analysis, Part IV moves beyond the lectures to apply the 
methodology of cultural history to ﬁgure out how all the formulations of demo-
cratic policing may have cohered in Hall’s mind. For additional context, this part 
considers two early Cold War cases, Brinegar v. State, a routine state criminal 
case, and Abel v. United States, a more high-proﬁle case that implicated national 
security.
38
 The discourses that these cases prompted illustrate not only how con-
cerns about democratic policing and totalitarianism resonated broadly in Amer-
ican society but also how the American public, like Hall, justiﬁed discretionary, 
even lawless, policing by ﬁnding reassurance in the fact that criminal defendants 
received fair trials in which neutral judges, not the police, decided the outcome 
of their cases. 
Relying on a wide range of sources from newspapers and pamphlets to mem-
oirs and letters, this Essay posits that Hall’s lectures were not intended simply to 
offer an exegesis of due process in the police context. They were part of a larger 
effort to differentiate the United States from a police state when American police 
exercised authority in ways that were necessary for social order and yet seemed 
reminiscent of totalitarian police behavior.
39
 During the early Cold War, many 
jurists worried that discretionary power paved a slippery slope to dictatorial 
power. More conservative scholars like Hall understood discretion and the rule 
of law to be mutually exclusive concepts. But policing, a mode of governance 
that Hall did not question, inherently entailed the exercise of discretion. The 
disconnect between the reality of policing on the ground and the lofty ideals as-
sociated with democratic governance lies at the heart of Hall’s seeming contra-
dictions. Like shadowboxing with an invisible opponent, Hall grappled with the 
conundrum of police in a democratic society, unable to see or acknowledge that 
discretion, the source of that conundrum, was pervasive and unavoidable. He 
was caught between the association of discretion with totalitarian regimes on the 
one hand and the necessity of discretionary policing on the other. 
Hall did not resolve this puzzle with a belated recognition and acceptance of 
police discretion. Instead, his solution entailed a redeﬁnition. He revised his def-
inition of democratic policing—from self-rule, to the rule of law, and ﬁnally to 
due process—to accommodate police action, rather than the other way around, 
which would have required signiﬁcant reforms to policing as it was then prac-
 
38. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Brinegar v. State, 262 P.2d 464 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1953). 
39. Cf. Richard Primus, A Brooding Omnipresence: Totalitarianism in Postwar Constitutional 
Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 423, 423 (1996) (tracing how twentieth-century “constitutional 
thought still operates within the framework deﬁned by opposition to Nazism and com-
munism”). 




 Not only did due process justify the police’s tremendous discretion, but 
a fair trial with requisite procedures also symbolized the difference between de-
mocracy and totalitarianism—two competing systems of governance that both 
relied on discretionary authority.
41
 Historicizing due process as a cultural norm 
illuminates how that concept served to rationalize police discretion in response 
to the Cold War imperative to distinguish American police from totalitarian po-
lice. This legacy of due process perpetuated the message that even if Americans 
were not free from discretionary policing, and even if due process did not guar-
antee substantive justice, they still lived in a free society. 
Finally, Part V situates this midcentury perspective as a prelude to the War-
ren Court’s Due Process Revolution and, in doing so, questions the prevailing 
interpretation of twentieth-century criminal procedure as a project to constrain 
the discretion of individual police officers.
42
 This “modern,” but ahistorical, view 
so dominates our current thinking that not only have careful readers overempha-
sized Hall’s concern with police discretion in his lectures, but we have also mis-
read the Supreme Court’s revolutionary decisions.
43
 Hall’s understanding of due 
process was not an outlier; it reﬂected midcentury legal culture. The Warren 
Court Justices shared that culture, and it informed their decisions that governed 
the police primarily by protecting the judicial role in adjudicatory proceedings, 
particularly the warrant process, rather than by establishing substantive limits 
on police discretion. While the choice of procedural rights over substantive 
rights can become meaningless when theorized, this choice mattered in the real 
world.
44
 Choosing procedure over substance reﬂected an a priori choice to accept 
 
40. Dan Ernst has argued that the understanding of rule of law as “a state bound by rules” fell to 
a rival understanding of rule of law as “an appeal from government officials to independent, 
common-law courts.” DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900-1940, at 2 (2014). This Essay shows how Jerome Hall held 
both understandings at the same time without acknowledging the tension between the two. 
41. See ROSEN, supra note 31, at 8 (describing the cultural study of law as an examination of “the 
ways in which facts are created for purposes of addressing differences”). 
42. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 297, 300-
02 (1993); SKLANSKY, supra note 13, at 33 (“Democratic policing [during the late 1950s 
through the 1970s] meant, above all, bringing the police under the ‘rule of law’: reining in 
the discretion of individual officers . . . .”); Kahan & Meares, supra note 6, at 1159 (identifying 
a “central feature of the modern criminal procedure regime [as] its hostility toward discre-
tion”). The opposition of due process and policing has been a longstanding perspective 
among American legal scholars. See Sarah A. Seo, Antinomies and the Automobile: A New Ap-
proach to Criminal Justice Histories, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1020, 1024-25 (2013). 
43. See, e.g., SKLANSKY, supra note 13, at 44 (summarizing Hall as arguing that “the wide scope of 
police discretion . . . violated a core component of democracy, the ‘rule of law’”). 
44. See STUNTZ, supra note 5, at 210-12 (concluding that there is “no good answer” for why the 
Warren Court did not adopt an “aggressive substantive review” of criminal laws in favor of a 
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a great deal of policing. In the postwar years and even through the 1960s, jurists 
sought not just to rein in the police’s discretionary authority, but also to legiti-
mize it. They did so by relying on due process, which functioned to justify police 
discretion—even when the exercise of that discretion amounted to lawless polic-
ing. 
Taking Hall seriously, as Darnton did the cat killers, reveals a past way of 
thinking about democratic policing that is more foreign to us in the twenty-ﬁrst 
century than we have previously realized. The payoff of studying that past is a 
clearer understanding of the motivations for legal change. We may gain a better 
understanding of why we have the laws we do by recognizing that as midcentury 
jurists were hashing out what due process required, they were also trying to de-
ﬁne what it meant to be an American living in a free society. 
i .  self-rule on the police level  
The early Jerome Hall embraced a legal-realist view of law, a far cry from the 
legalism that would inform his 1952 lectures. He began his academic career in 
the 1930s by embarking on the progressive path that Roscoe Pound had forged.
45
 
Indeed, Pound later remembered Hall as “one of my most esteemed former stu-
dents.”
46
 In line with Pound’s sociological jurisprudence, Hall’s ﬁrst mono-
graph, Theft, Law and Society, published in 1935, included a chapter proposing 
that all petty thieves receive individualized treatment, which meant, according 
to Hall, “that a person convicted of a crime is not punished in accordance with 
narrow, predetermined rules laid down with regard to objectively deﬁned behav-
ior, but is treated as required by his own social and psychic needs.”
47
 As an ex-
emplar of this streamlined procedure, Hall cited juvenile courts that dispensed 





“detailed law of procedure” regulating law enforcement); William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, 
and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 10, 13 (1996). 
45. See THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, FREEDOM AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICAN LEGAL 
THOUGHT 151-57 (2014). 
46. Letter from Roscoe Pound, Dean Emeritus, Harvard Law Sch., to Jerome Hall, Professor, Ind. 
Sch. of Law (Oct. 15, 1963) (on ﬁle with Jerome Hall Papers, Box 1, Folder “Correspondence 
P”). 
47. JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY 292 (1935); see also id. at 305 (“Of all the misdemean-
ors petty larceny affords the best opportunity for individualization of treatment.”). 
48. E.g., Jerome Hall, Social Science as an Aid to Administration of the Criminal Law, 3 DAKOTA L. 
REV. 285, 291 (1931) (“Fortunately, the juvenile court is relatively free from a traditional body 
of procedural rules . . . .”); cf. MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN 
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Just as Theft, Law and Society rolled off the presses, Hall immediately came 
to question its premises. That same year, in 1935, Hitler’s Germany enacted, in 
addition to the Nuremberg Laws, a statute that abrogated the principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege, which in Hall’s translation meant that “no conduct shall be held 
criminal unless it is speciﬁcally described in the behavior-circumstance element 
of a penal statute.”
49
 Two years later in 1937, Hall wrote an article about this 
legality principle and the related principle of nulla poena sine lege, which he used 
as the article’s title. Hall recognized that this phrase had several meanings, but 
he settled on the deﬁnition that “no person shall be punished except in pursu-
ance of a statute which ﬁxes a penalty for criminal behavior.”
50
 For Hall, this also 
meant that “penal statutes must be strictly construed.”
51
 In the article, he argued 
that “[e]ven the all-powerful state, indeed, especially the all-powerful state, 
must use the regular channels of due process before any individual can be pun-
ished.”
52
 In an even clearer admission of misgivings, Hall acknowledged “[t]hat 
the abolition of law took place ﬁrst in the treatment of juveniles” and that “the 
possibilities” of “the movement for individualization” were “now apparent.”
53
 
He also added a footnote to qualify his earlier writing on the treatment of petty 
larceny, clarifying that “the major objective was to formulate a general theory 
regarding individualization, rather than to advance a particular reform.”
54
 
By the late 1940s, Hall’s views were set. General Principles of Criminal Law 
included Nulla Poena Sine Lege and focused largely on mens rea.
55
 In 1952, Her-
bert Wechsler and the American Law Institute invited Hall to serve as a member 
of the Advisory Committee on the Model Penal Code, which Hall did until his 
resignation four years later because of a substantive disagreement on the issue of 
 
PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO 79-82 (2003) (describing the minimal procedural rules in Chi-
cago’s juvenile courts). 
49. Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47 YALE L.J. 165, 165 (1937); see also Gesetz zur Änderung 
des Strafgesetzbuchs [Law to Change the Penal Code], June 28, 1935, RGBL I at 839, art. 1, 
§ 2 (Ger.), translated in OFFICE OF THE U.S. CHIEF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMI-
NALITY, 4 NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION 600, 600 (1946), http://avalon.law.yale.edu
/imt/1962-ps.asp [https://perma.cc/97WH-LYWR] (“Any person who commits an act 
which the law declares to be punishable or which is deserving of penalty according to the 
fundamental conceptions of the penal law and sound popular feeling, shall be punished. If 
there is no penal law directly covering an act it shall be punished under that law which most 
closely ﬁts, in regards to fundamental conception.”). 
50. Hall, supra note 49, at 165. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 192. 
53. Id. at 189. 
54. Id. at 183 n.68. 
55. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (1960). 




 Hall had strongly opposed the inclusion of negligence 
liability in penal law, in part because it violated nulla poena sine lege.
57
 His Living 
Law of Democratic Society, confusing to contemporary readers
58
 and still inscru-
table today, sought to reclaim positive law mainly through redeﬁnition and again 
mentioned the Nazi law of June 28, 1935, as a countermodel to support his argu-
ment.
59
 Clearly, what had happened in Germany indelibly shaped Hall’s think-
ing about criminal law. 
The threat of totalitarianism also informed Hall’s views about the police.
60
 
When he read about what was going on around the world—refugees arriving 
from the “fascist dictatorships of Italy and Germany” and defectors coming from 
behind the Iron Curtain who bore the “horrible scars of police violence,” “scien-
tiﬁc tortures[,] and enslavement”—he could not help but think about the police 
in his own country. The acts of “depravity” and “brutality” abroad seemed trou-
blingly comparable, perhaps not in degree but certainly in kind, to “American 
third degrees” and “the torture of Negroes by the police in some communities.”
61
 
“At no time in history has it been easier to compare the police of democratic so-




Hall was not alone in making this comparison. Police abuse in the United 
States recalled European upheavals in the minds of American jurists as well. In 
 
56. Letter from Herbert F. Goodrich, Dir., Am. Law Inst. to Jerome Hall, Professor, Univ. of Ind. 
Sch. of Law (Feb. 27, 1952) (on ﬁle with Jerome Hall Papers, Box 2, Folder “Correspond-
ence”); see also Letter from Herbert Wechsler, Professor, Columbia Univ., to Jerome Hall, Pro-
fessor, Univ. of Ind. Sch. of Law (Jan. 10, 1956) (on ﬁle with Jerome Hall Papers, Box 2, Folder 
“Correspondence W”); Letter from Herbert Wechsler, Professor, Columbia Univ., to Jerome 
Hall, Professor, Univ. of Ind. Sch. of Law (Dec. 4, 1950) (on ﬁle with Jerome Hall Papers, Box 
2, Folder “Correspondence W”). 
57. See Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 
632, 636 (1963) (“[I]f there is any doubt regarding any of the relevant criteria—voluntariness 
and the suitability and effectiveness of punishment—the issue should be resolved by narrow-
ing penal liability.”). 
58. See, e.g., Thomas A. Cowan, Book Review, 26 IND. L.J. 137, 137-38 (1950) (observing that 
“everyone[]’s writing on the nature of law including my own and Professor Hall’s” is “con-
fusing”); William J. Kenealy, Book Review, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 954, 955, 956 (1950) (admitting 
that “the reviewer frankly fails to follow” the thesis and describing “a certain obscurity of 
expression”). 
59. See JEROME HALL, LIVING LAW OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 54 (1949). 
60. For an exposition on totalitarianism contemporaneous with Hall’s lectures, see, for example, 
HANNAH ARENDT, ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1951); and see also SKLANSKY, supra note 13, 
at 17-18. 
61. See Hall, supra note 2, at 139-42. 
62. Id. at 139. 
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a 1955 case where the police had entered and searched a home without a warrant, 
Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court wrote that such practices could 
turn a democratic society into “the police state.”
63
 This was not an abstract 
worry. Justice Traynor called it “one of the foremost public concerns,” in the light 
of “recent history” that “demonstrated all too clearly how short the step is from 
lawless although efficient enforcement of the law to the stamping out of human 
rights.”
64
 This recent history also inspired a group of Berkeley researchers—two 
of whom were themselves political emigres from Nazi-occupied territories—to 
publish The Authoritarian Personality in 1950. This inﬂuential study did not dis-
cuss the police, but for some readers, its association of the “potentially fascistic 




Even those working in law enforcement were aware of this common percep-
tion. A police chief who gave the keynote address at the 1945 Annual Conference 
of the International Association of Chiefs of Police simultaneously acknowl-
edged and deﬂected criticisms of the police by insisting that the “police are pos-
sessed of prejudices in about the same proportion as our general civilian public, 
and they acquired them in the same way.”
66
 To generalize the problem and em-
phasize the public’s shared duty with the police to prevent race riots, he main-
tained that it was a “Nazi technique to pit race against race, religion against reli-
gion, prejudice against prejudice, and thus divide and conquer.”
67
 Yet the 
speaker failed to mention the riots where the police had inﬂamed tensions by 
abusing racial minority groups.
68
 Incidents like these forced Hall to grapple with 
 
63. People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 912 (Cal. 1955). For an example in a U.S. Supreme Court opin-
ion, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949), which states that the sheriff’s warrantless 
search and seizure of the abortion doctor’s office “did not need the commentary of recent 
history to be condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights enshrined in 
the history and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples.” 
64. Cahan, 282 P.2d at 912. 
65. T.W. ADORNO ET AL., THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 2 (1950); SKLANSKY, supra note 13, 
at 17, 30 (discussing the midcentury fear of the authoritarian personality and its association 
with police officers). 
66. JOSEPH T. KLUCHESKY, POLICE ACTION IN MINORITY PROBLEMS 4 (1945) (on ﬁle with the 
UCLA Library Special Collections, American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California 
Records, Box 24, Folder 13). 
67. Id. at 13-14. 
68. See, e.g., EDUARDO OBREGÓN PAGÁN, MURDER AT THE SLEEPY LAGOON: ZOOT SUITS, RACE, 
AND RIOT IN WARTIME L.A. 26, 134-35 (2003) (describing the Zoot Suit Riot); THOMAS J. 
SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT 29 
(1996) (describing race riots in Detroit). 
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“the unavoidable question, what essential differences, if any, are there between 
American police and the Gestapo or NKVD?”
69
 
Hall endeavored to answer this question in his three Chicago lectures. Police 
and Law in a Democratic Society represented a mature Hall’s attempt to reconcile 
his understanding of democracy and the police function. The ﬁrst lecture, re-
vealingly titled Standards, sketched the broad outlines of his theory of democratic 
policing. In the following lecture, called Preventive Measures and Arrest, Hall con-
tinued to reﬁne his theory—or to redeﬁne democratic policing—as he discussed 
how a democratic society should address the problem of police lawlessness. Hall 
then sought to debunk the opposition between Security and Civil Liberty, the title 
of his ﬁnal lecture. While this summary suggests the lectures were conceptually 
linear, they were anything but. Throughout, Hall constantly switched back and 
forth not only between different deﬁnitions of democratic policing but also be-
tween theory and application, reﬂecting his efforts to grapple with undeniable 
evidence that the police in the United States often engaged in unlawful and abu-
sive conduct. 
Articulating the theoretical differences between American police and Nazi or 
Soviet police became easier when Hall set aside actual incidents of police brutal-
ity. Although he acknowledged that “wholesale torture and democracy obviously 
cannot co-exist,” he began his lectures by submitting that the “essential cri-
teri[on] of the police in a democratic society” was not the absence of abuse.
70
 
Rather, the fundamental character of democratic policing was “self-rule on the 
police level,” or “self-policing.”
71
 By “self-policing,” Hall seemed to have in mind 
self-government through some sort of public participation or control over polic-
ing.
72
 Of course, local communities would have been no help to minority citi-
zens. Law enforcement participation in lynchings in the Jim Crow South pro-
vided the most extreme example of the perils of self-rule.
73
 Nevertheless, Hall as 
legal philosopher sought to distill the essence of democratic police. As a matter 
of theory, just as the difference between democracy and totalitarianism lay in 
 
69. Hall, supra note 2, at 140. 
70. Id. at 140. 
71. Id. at 139. 
72. See, e.g., id. at 145 (“Intelligent Americans therefore have a major job to do—ﬁrst, to under-
stand the meanings of police service in a democratic society; then, by their support and coop-
eration, they must create a police force that is capable of discharging its duties in a manner 
that strengthens the democratic way of life.”). 
73. See David Garland, Penal Excess and Surplus Meaning: Public Torture Lynchings in Twentieth-
Century America, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 793, 793-95, 809-15 (2005). 
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Notwithstanding the clarity of this distinction, Hall struggled to account for 
the reality that in the twentieth century, policing had become a government ser-
vice in which citizens played a minor role and, if police chiefs had their way, the 
people would have very little say. In other words, self-policing hardly existed in 
America. This development came about largely from the professionalization 
movement, beginning in the Progressive Era, which sought to unify and central-
ize police functions.
75
 As police scholar Samuel Walker observed, by the late 
1930s, policing had acquired the basic aspects of professionalism, namely, a mo-
nopoly on specialized knowledge, autonomy and the right to exclude others, and 
a commitment to public service.
76
 Although localization remained typical of po-
licing in the United States, progressive police reforms marked a shift away from 
ward inﬂuences and towards bureaucratic centralization.
77
 In many municipali-
ties, reformers replaced the spoils system with civil service exams and required 
specialized training.
78
 Some cities even prohibited officers from living in the 
beats they patrolled.
79
 Police chiefs also vociferously opposed citizen review 
boards.
80
 Having to answer to civilians diverged from the goals of professional-
ization, which endeavored to make the police more independent and less vulner-
 
74. See id. at 817-19, 822; Hall, supra note 2, at 143. 
75. In big cities like New York and Boston, police centralization happened much earlier. See, e.g., 
George H. McCaffrey, The Boston Police Department, 2 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
672, 678 (1911) (noting that for the past twenty-six years, “the Boston police have been under 
state control,” and acknowledging that this “may be an encroachment on the principle of 
‘home rule,’” but that “there can be no doubt whatever that . . . it has brought about a most 
marked improvement in every branch of Boston’s police administration”); see also WALKER, 
supra note 5, at 114 (discussing the impact of the “expanding professional-managerial class” 
in increasing state police power). 
76. SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM: THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSION-
ALISM, at ix-x, 167-68 (1977). For how police professionalization claimed autonomy for the 
institution of policing, see SKLANSKY, supra note 13, at 34-38. 
77. CAROL A. ARCHBOLD, POLICING: A TEXT/READER 7, 9 (2013) (“The professionalization move-
ment of the police in America resulted in police agencies becoming centralized bureaucracies 
focused primarily on crime control.”). 
78. SAMUEL WALKER, THE POLICE IN AMERICA: AN INTRODUCTION 10-11 (1983); see also O.W. 
WILSON, POLICE ADMINISTRATION 342-53, 376-85 (1950) (describing model forms of selection 
and training). 
79. ARCHBOLD, supra note 77, at 34; WILSON, supra note 78, at 336-37. 
80. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 76, at 173; Norman H. Moore, A Page out of the Communist Man-
ual—“Police Review Boards,” CAL. PEACE OFFICER, Nov.-Dec. 1960, at 51; ACLU Blasted on Po-
lice Review Plan, L.A. HERALD & EXPRESS, June 16, 1960, at D-5; Editorial, Police Review Board 
Is a One-Sided Plan, STAR-NEWS (Pasadena, Cal.), June 2, 1960, at 12; Alan Gartner, The Police 
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able to the vagaries of public opinion.
81
 All of these developments made plain 
that self-rule did not describe policing in the United States.
82
 
To be sure, by Hall’s time, theories of democracy had themselves evolved. 
According to David Sklansky, the 1950s marked a “watershed” moment when 
democratic pluralism gained orthodox status.
83
 Deﬁning their new theory 
largely in contrast to the totalitarian systems of Nazi Germany and the Soviet 
Union, pluralists eyed mass politics with distrust and turned to “responsible 
leaders” and interest groups to manage a stable democratic society.
84
 The leading 
theory of democracy at midcentury thus rejected the town-hall paradigm for the 
marketplace, in which average citizens did not participate in day-to-day govern-
ance and instead enjoyed—consumed—the beneﬁts of a democratic system.
85
 
Lay involvement was limited to electing officials who specialized in governing. 
By the middle of the twentieth century, democracy had become more efficient. 
Hall’s historical explanation for the “specialization of police functions” re-
ﬂected this consumerist conception of democracy.
86
 Wrinkling through time, he 
began by delving into the origins of American police and found the “embryo of 
a democratic police force” in Anglo-Saxon England a thousand years prior, when 
every man had a duty to join the “hue and cry.”
87
 Within a page, Hall covered 
the evolution of the “tithingman,” to the “parish constable,” to the “Watch and 
Ward” and, ﬁnally, to the early nineteenth-century “Bobbies,” London’s profes-
sional police officers.
88
 By 1829, Hall explained, organized gangsters and riots 
 
and the Community: Police Practices and Minority Groups 23-24 (1965) (unpublished man-
uscript) (on ﬁle with the NAACP Archives, Folder 001475-015-0481, ProQuest History Vault) 
(advocating for citizen-complaint procedures despite police opposition). 
81. See WALKER, supra note 76, at 173; see also BRUCE SMITH, THE STATE POLICE: ORGANIZATION 
AND ADMINISTRATION 260 (1925) (arguing against the “division of responsibility” over police 
forces and for uniﬁed administrative control of police executives). 
82. See SKLANSKY, supra note 13, at 35 (“Police professionalization meant politically insulated po-
lice departments organized along hierarchical, quasi-military lines, with strong commitments 
to . . . centralized command . . . .”); SMITH, supra note 81, at 253 (“[T]he state police [in the 
United States] are more nearly akin to the police forces of Europe, than to the most common 
type of American police department.”). For the views of “sympathetic critics of the New Deal” 
concerned about “the relationship between expertise and democracy,” see ANNE M. KORN-
HAUSER, DEBATING THE AMERICAN STATE: LIBERAL ANXIETIES AND THE NEW LEVIATHAN, 1930-
1970, at 55 (2015). 
83. SKLANSKY, supra note 13, at 14. 
84. Id. at 20, 18-24. 
85. Id. at 13-14, 18-19, 21-23. 
86. Hall, supra note 2, at 134. 
87. Id. at 135. 
88. Id. at 135-36. 
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struck more terror in Londoners than “the fear of tyrannical police.”
89
 But the 
important point for Hall was that “the new police force was not the child of Par-
liament, but developed from ancient institutions, close to the practices and hab-
its of the people.”
90
 From this history, Hall drew the conclusion that “the police 
function in a democratic society is epitomized as self-policing, which specializa-
tion and the remuneration of a trained force do not alter.”
91
 According to Hall, 
American police, given their lineage, were not really specialized agents of the 
state. In the United States, which inherited English traditions and whose cities 
modeled their police forces after the London Metropolitan Police, “the existence 
of a professional [police] force does not in the least alter that duty” of every cit-
izen to do police work, “but only facilitates its skillful discharge.”
92
 The common 
notion that policing “belongs exclusively to the publicly employed police offic-
ers” was a “misapprehension,” “fallacy,” and “myth.”
93
 The truth, Hall main-
tained, was that “police work rests on every citizen.”
94
 American police were 
simply undertaking the “full-time performance of the duties of all citizens.”
95
 
Put simply, the specialization of police work was merely an efficient allocation of 
the obligations of citizenship. 
Perhaps recognizing how strained this conclusion may have seemed, Hall 
granted that the specialization of police functions posed the “greatest obstacle to 
understanding the police problem.”
96
 But removing that obstacle did not occur 
to him. Like most Americans, he could not imagine society without the police, 
musing that it was “very likely that in every society disorder has been a threat to 
 
89. Id. at 134-35. Hall’s historical foray may have been brief, in part, because the history was gen-
erally understood. In 1953, E.W. Roddenberry, a sergeant in the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment’s “public information office”—his job was to write promotional materials for the 
LAPD—lectured on “Early Police Systems,” which was essentially identical to Hall’s account. 
E.W. Roddenberry, Early Police Systems, L.A. POLICE BEAT, Dec. 1953, at 18-21 (on ﬁle with Los 
Angeles City Archives, Erin W. Piper Technical Center, Box B-2283). Roddenberry later wrote 
television scripts and gained fame as the creator of Star Trek. The character Spock was alleg-
edly based on LAPD Chief William Parker. 2 THOMAS A. REPPETTO, AMERICAN POLICE: A HIS-
TORY, 1945-2012, at 34 n.7 (2012). 
90. Hall, supra note 2, at 136. 
91. Id. at 143; see also Roddenberry, supra note 89, at 20-21 (comparing the “kin-police system” of 
England, where “police power . . . remained in the hands of the people,” with the “Gendar-
merie system” of continental Europe, in which “public cooperation is not vital to effective-
ness”). 
92. Hall, supra note 2, at 135. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 139. 
96. Id. at 134. 
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survival, hence a permanent problem, and that organized police forces have 
functioned everywhere and at all times to maintain order principally by prevent-
ing crimes and apprehending offenders.”
97
 Hall emphasized the timelessness 
and “universality” of police by normalizing, even naturalizing, their enforcement 
of criminal laws.
98
 For support, he referred to studies of Indian tribes showing 
“the origin of both criminal law and police in the need to maintain order in the 
buffalo hunt.”
99
 Given the unquestioned need for law enforcement, Hall’s chal-
lenge was to articulate how twentieth-century police forces accorded with tradi-
tional democratic principles. It was a difficult task when held against a pure con-
cept of self-rule. 
i i .  the police aspect of rule of law  
Hall may have started his ﬁrst lecture by ﬁnding the origins of American po-
lice in early forms of self-government, but he ended it with another deﬁnition of 
democratic policing—“the rule of law.”
100
 In dictatorial states, he explained, the 
police acted with “sheer physical force unlimited by law,” which was “the anti-
thesis of the rule of law” found in a democratic society.
101
 The rule of law, Hall 
now argued, was the essential difference between the two systems of govern-
ment. Notably, Hall introduced this new deﬁnition without any transition or 
distinction between the ideas of self-policing and legal constraints on policing. 
Indeed, he seemed unaware that he had shifted emphasis from self-rule to the 
rule of law even though these deﬁnitions conveyed different ideas. Rule by the 
people required some form of public involvement or control while rule by law, 
at its most basic, meant police conformity to all laws, whether legislatively en-
acted or judicially decreed. 
Hall discussed the rule of law most extensively when explaining the police 
function in a democratic society. In his view, the American system of government 
did not empower police officers to make law, like legislators, or interpret law, like 
judges. Rather, their job was to enforce law—a task that, in Hall’s mind, did not 
involve exercising discretion. By midcareer, Hall had developed strong opinions 
about discretionary authority. As a junior scholar in the early 1930s, he aligned 
with legal realists who deﬂated the notion that law was natural or “a brooding 
 
97. Id. at 139. 
98. Id. at 138. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 143. 
101. Id.  
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omnipresence in the sky”
102
 and argued that doctrinal formalism could not pre-
vent judges from deciding cases for personal or political reasons. Rather than try 
to restrain the power of choice, reformers sought to use this reality for progres-
sive purposes. They hoped that judges, after surrendering the illusion of an au-
tonomous law, would clear the way for administrative bureaucrats equipped 
with knowledge of the social world to govern an increasingly complex society. 
Along these lines, Hall wrote articles such as Social Science as an Aid to Admin-
istration of the Criminal Law.
103
 But by the late 1930s, he shed his more youthful 
idealism and turned to traditional ideas about the boundary between law and 
social science. Sociological positivism, he came to believe, lent itself to “the effi-
ciency engineer, the mechanist, the dictator.”
104
 The collapse of constitutional 
regimes and the rise of totalitarianism in Europe highlighted the dangers of the 
administrative state and prompted Hall’s apostasy. The fear that the United 
States might be veering in the same direction prompted once-progressive think-
ers like Pound and Hall to change their tune, charging that the New Deal had 
spurned the rule of law for “administrative absolutism.”
105
 As Hall later recalled, 
he “was interested to separate [him]self from the extremes of Legal Realism.”
106
 
It was in this vein that Hall presented his lectures in 1952. When, by the end 
of the ﬁrst lecture, he gestured to the “vast literature discuss[ing] rule of law in 
many of its phases and applications,”
107
 Hall probably had in mind the political 
 
102. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The common law is 
not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-
sovereign that can be identiﬁed.”). 
103. Hall, supra note 48. 
104. HALL, supra note 59, at 64. 
105. Roscoe Pound, Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 331, 
340 (1938); see also DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 48 (2011); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 219-22, 225, 230-33 
(1992); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY IN 
NEW YORK, 1920-1980, at 121-30 (2001) (dating the “legalist reformation” to 1938, the year of 
Kristallnacht); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC 
NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 159-78 (1973); WILLRICH, supra note 48, at 315-18; 
Primus, supra note 39, at 427-29; Shaw, supra note 35, at 688 (quoting David Sugarman, Hart 
Interviewed: H.L.A. Hart in Conversation with David Sugarman, 32 J.L. & SOC’Y, 267, 279 (2005) 
(“The word ‘positivist’ had a tremendously evil ring [at Harvard] . . . . I remember hearing 
somebody say, ‘You know he’s a positivist, but he’s quite a nice man.’”)). For a critique of the 
“use of the totalitarian specter both to explain and justify mid-twentieth-century political 
moderation,” see Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. 
REV. 718, 733 n.65 (2016) (reviewing ERNST, supra note 40). 
106. Letter from Jerome Hall to Hans Zeisel, supra note 4. 
107. Hall, supra note 2, at 144; see also ERNST, supra note 40, at 1-2. 
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reverberations of Frederick Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom, which reached Ameri-
can readers in translation in 1944 and then in cartoon form in Look magazine the 
following year.
108
 In the postwar context, when every Western society, including 
the United States, had adopted some aspects of a “welfare state,” the Austrian’s 
well-publicized book renewed discussions about an idea that many Americans 
came to associate with the long-cherished phrase, “government of laws and not 
of men.”
109
 Of course, “government of laws” meant something different to John 
Adams when he used the phrase back in 1780.
110
 Indeed, one can trace the con-
cept of rule of law farther back, perhaps even to ﬁfth-century BCE Greece.
111
 
Even in mid-twentieth-century America, the rule of law meant different things 
to different people.
112
 But at least since A.V. Dicey’s 1885 Law of the Constitution—
which Hall cited in Nulla Poena Sine Lege
113
—the legalist tradition served as a 
critique of administrative regulation.
114
 Hayek offered the purest deﬁnition of 
“rule of law” in The Road to Serfdom, insisting that the concept required preestab-
lished rules to constrain all government action.
115
 In this exposition, rule of law 
 
108. The Road to Serfdom in Cartoons, LOOK, https://mises.org/sites/default/ﬁles/Road%20to
%20Serfdom%20in%20Cartoons.pdf [https://perma.cc/TND2-BR9L]. On Hayek’s inﬂu-
ence in American law, see HORWITZ, supra note 105, at 228-30. See generally GOVERNMENT 
UNDER LAW: A CONFERENCE HELD AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL ON THE OCCASION OF THE BI-
CENTENNIAL OF JOHN MARSHALL, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1801-1835 (Arthur E. 
Sutherland ed., 1956) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW]. 
109. Harry W. Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 143, 144 (1958). On 
anticommunist rhetoric against the administrative state, see JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE UN-
WIELDY AMERICAN STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE THE NEW DEAL 144-45 (2012). 
110. Cf. NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMER-
ICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780-1940, at 15 (2013) (identifying the shift during the 1810s to 1840s in 
the “elite deﬁnition of the ‘rule of law’” from “the participatory self-governance of local com-
munities toward a more positivist view centered on the state legislature and on relatively ob-
jective, rule-bound claims to rights on the part of white male citizens”). 
111. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 7-31 (2004). 
112. Jones, supra note 109, at 144 (“It is difficult to deﬁne the term, even as understood in the 
United States.”). 
113. Hall, supra note 49, at 169 n.23. 
114. See, e.g., ERNST, supra note 40, at 2-3, 30-33; HORWITZ, supra note 105, at 219-22, 225-26; Jer-
emy Waldron, Thoughtfulness and the Rule of Law, 18 BRIT. ACAD. REV. 1, 3 (2011). 
115. 2 F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM: TEXT AND DOCUMENTS, THE DEFINITIVE EDITION 112 
(Bruce Caldwell ed., 2007) (1944) (“Stripped of all technicalities, [Rule of Law] means that 
government in all its actions is bound by rules ﬁxed and announced beforehand . . . . [T]he 
essential point, that the discretion left to the executive organs wielding coercive power should 
be reduced as much as possible, is clear enough.”); see also HORWITZ, supra note 105, at 225-
30. 
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was fundamentally incompatible with administrative discretion, the very fuel 
that ran the regulatory state. 
This formulation took root in American political and legal thought. Even 
scholars remaining within the New Deal fold ﬁxated on the seemingly inherent 
tension between discretion and rule of law, which had not worried them previ-
ously. In their optimistic fervor, neither progressives nor legal realists had set 
forth principled limits to discretionary authority, and this had real conse-
quences.
116
 For example, progressive reforms justiﬁed sterilization of women 
charged, even if not yet convicted, with prostitution or public immorality.
117
 In 
the postwar aftermath of fascism and Nazism, pro-welfare statists found them-
selves on the defensive, in search of a theory that might legitimize administrative 
governance under the rule of law, a middle road between the free fall of discre-
tion and the bulwark of legalism. “Legal-process” scholars—many of them at 
Harvard Law School, a training ground for New Deal bureaucrats—fashioned a 
workable solution: provide guidelines for administrative decision makers that 
would make their exercise of discretion “lawlike and legitimate.”
118
 
Notwithstanding the efforts of process theory, the Oxford legal philosopher 
H.L.A. Hart observed that “[t]hrough English Eyes,” American jurisprudence 
 
116. Letter from Jerome Hall to Hans Zeisel, supra note 4 (“I think if you talk to Ed Levi or any 
other person who lived through the jurisprudence of the 30’s he would agree with me that 
they were skeptical of rules of law. Of course there was no school . . . .”); see BERNSTEIN, supra 
note 105, at 40 (“Leading legal Progressives were hostile or indifferent to many of the priorities 
of modern liberals, especially regarding what came to be known as civil liberties and civil 
rights.”); id. at 42 (“This opposition to constitutional protection of natural rights and support 
for judicial deference to legislation never became a full-ﬂedged intellectual movement . . . .”); 
Shaw, supra note 35, at 709; see also ERNST, supra note 40, at 9-10, 19-20 (discussing Felix 
Frankfurter’s understanding of the external and internal checks on administrative action); id. 
at 32-33, 36, 71 (discussing Charles Evans Hughes and his transformation of Dicey’s “rule of 
law” into “rule of lawyers” to legitimate the administrative state); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Ad-
ministrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1083-84 (2014) 
(arguing that federal War Department lawyers embraced civil libertarianism as a tool of state-
building). 
117. WILLRICH, supra note 48, at 242, 263; see also THOMAS C. LEONARD, ILLIBERAL REFORMERS: 
RACE, EUGENICS & AMERICAN ECONOMICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 109-28 (2016) (discussing 
the eugenics movement and its intersections with racism). 
118. Shaw, supra note 35, at 677 (quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Commen-
tary, The Making of The Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2048 (1994)); see also Michael 
Willrich, Criminal Justice in the United States, in 3 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 
195, 213 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008) (contextualizing the Model 
Penal Code project, undertaken by the legal-process scholar Herbert Wechsler, within the 
“Cold War context” when “it seemed more important than ever to ensure that American crim-
inal justice rested on time-honored legal principles, rather than political ﬁat or administrative 
discretion”). 
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still “oscillated between two extremes,” the “nightmare” of unconstrained dis-
cretion and the “noble dream” of complete legal determinacy.
119
 Hart had per-
sonally witnessed the difficulty Americans had with thinking outside of this du-
alism. In 1956, he visited Harvard Law School at the invitation of the legal-
process theorists.
120
 Hart had their concerns in mind when he presented a paper 
titled Discretion, which argued that it was a misconception to view discretion and 
rule of law in opposition—that, in fact, indeterminacy was a natural part of life 
and, accordingly, discretion was an essential part of law itself.
121
 Later, he ex-
pressed frustration that his ideas seemed “repellent” to his Harvard audience.
122
 
Within this larger discourse about the legitimacy of the administrative state, 
Hall maintained that the “rule of law on the most important level of all” was the 
“police aspect of rule of law.”
123
 The emphasis on this most important level belied 
a self-justiﬁcation for the topic of his lectures, but it also hinted at a gap in legal-
process theory. Public-law scholars focused on judges and bureaucrats; the po-
lice never entered their discussions. A seven-page letter from Hall to Lon Fuller 
in 1948, outlining the reasons why Harvard Law School ought not to reduce the 
hours devoted to criminal law in the ﬁrst-year curriculum, suggests some anxiety 
on Hall’s part about the status of his ﬁeld in legal academia. Hall ended by re-
marking: 
I hope nothing said above will be provocative in the wrong direction. If 
criminal law is on the defensive, it is only natural that those who regard 
it as the most valuable of all the courses, should be tempted to use occa-
sional adjectives or to make some comparisons and raise challenges in 




119. H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, 
11 GA. L. REV. 969, 971-74, 978-80 (1977); see also NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART: THE 
NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE DREAM 328-64 (2006) (detailing Hart’s publication of The 
Nightmare and the Noble Dream as a response to one of his critics); Shaw, supra note 35, at 725 
(discussing Hart’s “charting [of] a middle road between the Nightmare and the Noble 
Dream”). 
120. Shaw, supra note 35, at 666-69. 
121. H.L.A. Hart, Discretion, 127 HARV. L. REV. 652, 660-61 (2013); see also Shaw, supra note 35, at 
726 (“As Hart saw it, discretion is deeply implicit in the concept of the rule of law.”). 
122. Shaw, supra note 35, at 711 (quoting Hart). 
123. Hall, supra note 2, at 144. 
124. Letter from Jerome Hall, Professor, Univ. of Ind. Sch. of Law, to Lon L. Fuller, Professor, Harv. 
Law Sch. (Jan. 6, 1948) (on ﬁle with Jerome Hall Papers, Box 1, Folder “Correspondence—
Lon Fuller”). 
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Hall repeated this sentiment in his ﬁrst lecture, when he pointed out that “the 
functions of police are permanent universal aspects of social organization” and, 
if not checked, could also serve as “the chief physical instrument of political dom-
ination.”
125
 Although Hall now seems prescient in calling attention to the rule-
of-law parameters of policing, his warning reﬂected distinctly postwar concerns 
that the police could serve as handmaidens of dictatorial power. 
Evoking Hayek, Hall stated that the “antithesis of the rule of law” was “dom-
ination by sheer physical force unlimited by law.”
126
 More simply, rule of law 
required legal limitations on police action, and like Hayek, Hall did not leave any 
room for discretion. In fact, he used the word “discretion” only once during his 
lectures—when speaking of “the unlimited discretion of even benevolent rul-
ers.”
127
 Hall knew what discretion was and abhorred it in the context of the ad-
ministrative state. But he did not think to use the word in the context of policing, 
for he did not believe that democratic police exercised discretion. Rather, they 
were mere law enforcers. 
Indicative of Hall’s thinking is his 1948 letter to Fuller.
128
 Fourth on the list 
of reasons in favor of keeping the four-hour criminal law course was “the prom-
inence given the ‘rule of law’” in criminal law, in contrast to “private law courses 
[that] tend to magnify discretion as does administrative law and other public 
law.”
129
 Hall went on to explain that he did “not know where else in the curric-
ulum it is possible to learn as readily and as fully the enduring signiﬁcance of the 
‘rule of law,’” which in criminal law was “manifested every day in countless 
cases.”
130
 Hall’s understanding of the rule of law as the absence of discretion 
corroborated Hart’s observation that American legal minds seemed to reside in 
extreme positions. But at least their conceptual delineations were clear. 
Paradoxically, Hall’s exposition became less clear with “speciﬁc concrete ap-
plications.”
131
 In his ﬁrst lecture, he demonstrated the rule of law “in action” by 
 
125. Hall, supra note 2, at 139, 140 (emphasis added); see also id. at 176-77 (“That is why the theme 
of this paper, though focused on the relatively narrow question of police functions, may have 
general signiﬁcance for the paramount problem of our times.”); cf. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 222 (1969) (“In our entire system of law 
and government, the greatest concentrations of unnecessary discretionary power over indi-
vidual parties are not in the regulatory agencies but are in police and prosecutors.”). 
126. Hall, supra note 2, at 143. 
127. Id. 
128. Letter from Jerome Hall to Lon L. Fuller, supra note 124. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Hall, supra note 2, at 144. 
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describing how an officer would execute the felony exception to the warrant re-
quirement under the common law of arrests: “The rule concretely exhibited in 
the arrest of John Doe by a police officer is: If I reasonably think X’s home was 
entered by someone intending to commit a crime there, and I reasonably think 
John Doe did that, it is my legal duty to arrest him.”
132
 Implicit in this example 
was reliance on the officer’s reasoned judgment—the officer must reasonably 
think John Doe entered the home with the intention to commit a crime. The rule 
depended on the arresting officer determining for himself, on the spot, whether 
circumstances justiﬁed a warrantless arrest. 
Absent from Hall’s explanation was judgment or discretion, the existence of 
which would have contravened the rule of law as he conceived it. Notwithstand-
ing his expertise on the subject, Hall seemed unaware that the standard of rea-
sonableness for warrantless arrests actually required a great deal of police discre-
tion.
133
 He understood warrantless arrests to conform with the rule of law 
because reasonableness provided a limiting principle; a police officer must “rea-
sonably think” before acting. But in fact, the felony rule expanded the scope of 
police action by creating an exception to the default rule requiring officers to get 
a warrant from a judicial officer before making an arrest—a requirement that 
served to check police discretion. In the larger scheme, the exception was a dis-
cretion-enhancing measure, not a discretion-limiting one. Put simply, warrant-
less arrests transferred part of the judicial function of determining reasonable or 
probable cause, at least in the ﬁrst instance, to individual officers.
134
 Of course, 
courts maintained that the probable-cause inquiry was ultimately a judicial 
question,
135
 but just as reasonableness functioned as a deferential safeguard 
against states’ legislative authority, it has also similarly accommodated police au-
thority.
136
 In many routine cases throughout the country, courts ceded much of 
 
132. Id. 
133. See THOMAS F. ADAMS, POLICE PATROL: TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES 26-27 (1971) (explaining 
that the word “reasonable” in criminal codes “provides for broad use of discretion by its law 
enforcement officers”); cf. Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amend-
ment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1134 (2012) (“[R]easonableness standards per-
meate the law regarding the Fourth Amendment.”). 
134. See, e.g., People v. Case, 190 N.W. 289, 293 (Mich. 1922) (Wiest, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
the automobile exception by asking, “Where does the Constitution depute to police officers 
the office of the magistrate in determining probable cause?”). 
135. See, e.g., Brinegar v. State, 262 P.2d 464, 479 (Okla. Crim. App. 1953). 
136. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes, 
104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1505-08 (2016); Lee, supra note 133, at 1147 (“[R]easonableness review as 
currently applied in the Fourth Amendment context is highly deferential, resulting in deci-
sions that usually uphold the challenged governmental action.”); Tracey Maclin, The Central 
Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 199-200, 210-11 (1993) 
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their judicial responsibility by deferring to the police’s justiﬁcations. In countless 
scenarios that unfolded daily between individuals and police officers, with only 
the nebulous reasonableness standard to govern these encounters, rule of law 
appeared to have deviated far from its ﬁrst principles. Hall’s illustration of the 
rule of law in action contradicted the basic premise of the rule of law in theory. 
Further reﬂecting the contradictions in the “police aspect of rule of law,” Hall 
referred to the warrant exception as both a rule and a standard, eliding any dif-
ferences between the two.
137
 This conﬂation is worth noting. In The Road to Serf-
dom, Hayek maintained that standards, which “qualify legal provisions increas-
ingly by reference to what is ‘fair’ or ‘reasonable,’” undermined rule of law and 
ultimately led to totalitarianism.
138
 This was a direct challenge to latter-day pro-
gressives such as Harlan Fiske Stone who articulated rights in the language of 
standards. In 1936, Stone wrote that the “great constitutional guarantees . . . of 
personal liberty and of property . . . are but statements of standards,” and that 
the “chief and ultimate standard which they exact is reasonableness of official 
action.”
139
 Hall’s proposition that “[r]ules of law are certain standards and com-
mands” evoked this progressive vision of rights.
140
 Indeed, Standards was the 
title of his ﬁrst lecture, which laid out his theory of democratic policing. This is 
puzzling given that by the 1950s, he had left behind his early progressive opti-
mism and embraced a more legalistic outlook.
141
 Hall was undoubtedly aware of 
rule-of-law criticisms of standards,
142
 but he failed to appreciate any differences 
between rules and standards when it came to policing, instead emphasizing how 
the standard of reasonableness was crucial to the rule of law. This blind spot 
allowed him to invoke a less-than-traditional view of rules and standards to jus-
tify the discretionary powers of the most authoritarian ﬁgure in American soci-
ety. 
 
(likening the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard to the rational basis standard, 
both of which are deferential to state action); see also infra note 208. 
137. Hall, supra note 2, at 144. 
138. HAYEK, supra note 115, at 116. Similarly, the early twentieth-century administrative law expert 
Ernst Freund proposed the model of the German Rechtsstaat, “a state bound by ﬁxed and cer-
tain rules that demarcate spheres of legitimate state action and of individual liberty.” ERNST, 
supra note 40, at 9. 
139. Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 23 (1936).  
140. Hall, supra note 2, at 144 (emphasis added). 
141. GREEN, supra note 45, at 151-57, 189-95. 
142. Early twentieth-century debates about freedom of contract were often abstracted into disputes 
about rules versus standards. See Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, American Balancing and 
German Proportionality: The Historical Origins, 8 ICON 263, 280-82 (2010). On freedom of 
contract, see, for example, HORWITZ, supra note 105, at 131; WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST 
WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 181 (1998); and Stone, supra note 139, at 23.  
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Certainly, Hall did not believe that law enforcers were automatons, and he 
was aware that some degree of rational thinking on the part of the police was 
necessary. But for him, the reasoning involved in police work did not involve 
ﬁguring out what to do in the gaps of existing laws; rather, it was limited to 
determining which laws governed a particular situation. Hall’s discussion in his 
second lecture of how the police should handle riots reﬂected this understand-
ing. “The ﬁrst insight into which legal controls to apply in such serious situations,” 
he explained, “is the perception that there are different kinds of mob disor-
der.”
143
 A good policeman, “familiar with his legal powers and duties, might often 
nip rioting in the bud” by discerning which laws were most appropriate for the 
circumstances at hand.
144
 The correct response could simply be demanding that 
the mob disperse, pursuant to the Riot Act. It might be summoning citizens to 
assist with quelling a riot, as the common law in many states provided. In the 
“Detroit type,” a “more serious kind of mob disorder,” an officer who did noth-
ing or who arrested one group of rioters while closing his eyes to the aggressions 




Hall did recognize that “the police must be selective in making arrests since 
it is physically impossible to arrest all offenders.”
146
 Yet even at this point—the 
closest he came to recognizing the discretion inherent in police work—he 
stopped short of identifying it as discretion and instead concluded that the “sit-
uation therefore demands realistic decisions guided by democratic goals and 
knowledge of the facts.”
147
 This democratic guidance also appeared in a recur-
ring tautology: the “policy to guide the police of a democratic society,” Hall as-
serted, was “to maintain order in ways that preserve and advance democratic 
values.”
148
 Logical circles provided a way to bypass discretion, enabling Hall to 
 
143. Hall, supra note 2, at 147 (emphasis added). 
144. Id. (emphasis added). 
145. Id. at 148. Hall was likely referring to the Detroit race riot of 1943. See, e.g., DOMINIC J. CAPECI, 
JR. & MARTHA WILKERSON, LAYERED VIOLENCE: THE DETROIT RIOTERS OF 1943 (1991); HER-
BERT SHAPIRO, WHITE VIOLENCE AND BLACK RESPONSE: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO MONT-
GOMERY 310-30 (1988). 
146. Hall, supra note 2, at 149. 
147. Id. at 149-50; see also HALL, supra note 59, at 101-08 (arguing that rules of law incorporate facts 
and, thus, law and facts are inseparable); cf. ALBERT R. BEISEL, JR., CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 3 (1955) (“Under Amer-
ican law, both federal and state, our police do not have full and complete discretion as to the 
manner, methods, procedures and practices which they can employ in investigating or in ap-
prehending and detaining persons suspected of having committed a crime.”). 
148. Hall, supra note 2, at 146; see also id. at 162 (“[T]he paramount police function is to maintain 
order in ways that preserve and enlarge democratic values.”). 
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describe the policeman not so much as a discretion-exercising official, but as a 
law enforcer who now and then required democratic inspiration to determine 
how best to implement the laws’ commands.
149
 
Not only did Hall fail to perceive that dispersing riots or even preventing one 
from forming required more than guidance from democratic ideals, but he also 
failed to grasp the discretion inherent in crime prevention. There were “available 
controls and legal measures which can be taken before crimes are committed or 
before serious aggressions occur,” Hall noted.
150
 He pointed out that police were 
legally authorized to arrest for solicitation, incitement, and conspiracy to commit 
a breach of the peace—inchoate behaviors that were criminalized in order “to 
check criminal conduct in its incipient stages.”
151
 Another “control of incipient 
symptoms of serious disorder” was the peace bond.
152
 In several states that al-
lowed the procedure, a court could require an individual who posed a threat to a 
person or property to post a bond. Failure to do so resulted in imprisonment. 
Hall endorsed peace bonds as a tool of “preventive justice” since the “statutes 
[were] broad enough to include the issuance of orders for recognizance against 
almost any threatened breach of the peace.”
153
 In other words, Hall appreciated 
peace bonds for offering legal provisions for proactive policing. He did not men-
tion, however, that this sounded functionally like the “[p]reventive, anticipatory 




Hall knew that police officers too often carried out their duties according to 
their whim rather than pursuant to legal norms. He was troubled by the “star-
tling fact that there is hardly a single physical brutality inﬂicted by the Gestapo 
and the NKVD which American policemen have not at some time perpe-
trated.”
155
 But for Hall, acting lawlessly was not the same as using discretion—
or rather, indiscretion—in the way that legal-process theorists understood what 
judges and administrative officials were doing when managing the regulatory 
state. Lawless behavior occurred when officers deﬁed existing laws; in contrast, 
 
149. See Frank J. Remington, Book Review, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 884, 891 (1969) (reviewing DAVIS, 
supra note 125) (“For some agencies, police, for example, it has traditionally been assumed 
that they merely ‘enforce the law’ and thus did not exercise discretionary power.”). 
150. Hall, supra note 2, at 150. 
151. Id. at 151. 
152. Id. at 150. 
153. Id. at 151. 
154. Id. at 141. 
155. Id. at 140. 
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discretion came into play when there were no laws to dictate outcomes in partic-
ular circumstances. This was the rule-of-law problem of administration: an in-
creasingly complex social world resulted in even more legal indeterminacy. Hall 
did not view the police as officials who exercised discretion to ﬁll gaps in legal 
rules. In his mind, the police simply enforced laws. 
Hall’s inclination to view what was essentially police discretion as either law-
lessness or democratically inspired lawfulness was typical of the period. There 
was a creeping sense, not yet fully formed, among judges and lawyers that legal 
indeterminacy existed in the world of policing as well. In 1953, the American Bar 
Foundation, with funds from the Ford Foundation, undertook a study of the 
entire criminal justice system, “from the time a crime is committed until the con-
vict is released from prison.”
156
 Justice Jackson, the ﬁrst committee chairman of 
the project, commented at its inception that even after decades as a rural lawyer, 
federal prosecutor, and Supreme Court Justice, he still had “the impression that 
no one really knows just how our criminal system is working and what its defects 
really are.”
157
 No one had conclusive answers for why crime was increasing and 
why law enforcement proved ineffective.
158
 In fact, what legal reformers found 
particularly problematic was the police’s decision “not to report crimes,” which 
meant that they were not fulﬁlling their role as law enforcers.
159
 
An important component of the study thus included an investigation of  
everyday police work that “encompass[ed] not only the acts of the officer but 
also the situation in which he acts.”
160
 To that end, “professional ﬁeld represent-
atives” observed and tabulated every moment of an officer’s working day. These 
meticulously gathered reports, legal reformers hoped, would provide a larger 
picture of the “deﬁciencies in a system of criminal justice.”
161
 Each ﬁeld report 
compiled over months and years added up to something of greater importance. 
 
156. AM. BAR FOUND., SURVEY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED 
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Law Library). 
157. Id. at 9. 
158. Id. at 6. 
159. Albert J. Harno, The American Law Institute Proceedings, May 20, 1954, I. Crime and Punishment, 
45 NW. J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 520, 523 (1954). 
160. O.W. Wilson, Selected Police Practices in the Administration of Criminal Justice, in 7 SURVEY OF 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY AND STATUS RE-
PORT 2 (July 1959) (on ﬁle with the University of Wisconsin Law Library). 
161. ARTHUR H. SHERRY, AM. BAR FOUND., THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE 
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Justice Jackson envisioned them as “building a cathedral to testify to our faith in 
the rule of law.”
162
 
By the late 1950s, as researchers began to pore over the ﬁeld reports, they 
were stunned to realize that the police exercised a great deal of unregulated dis-
cretion. Articles and books came out of this watershed moment with titles such 
as Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process and Arrest: The Decision to 
Take a Suspect into Custody.
163
 In 1969, administrative law scholar Kenneth Culp 
Davis would declare, “The police are among the most important policy-makers 
of our entire society. And they make far more discretionary determinations in 
individual cases than any other class of administrators; I know of no close sec-
ond.”
164
 Herman Goldstein, who began his career as a ﬁeld reporter in the police 
study,
165
 would come to claim, in his seminal 1977 book Policing a Free Society, 
that “it was only approximately ﬁfteen years ago that the existence of discretion 
in police work was ﬁrst openly recognized.”
166
 By “discovering” discretion some-
time around 1960, scholars came to acknowledge that preestablished rules and 
laws could not possibly dictate the entire domain of policing as the rule of law 
required.
167
 Police officers, like judges and administrators, had the power of 
choice. Tellingly, once reformers discovered police discretion, they sought to ap-
ply the same methods that structured the discretion of every other regulatory 
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Back in 1952, Hall did not perceive, or at least did not explicitly acknowledge, 
that officers exercised discretion and that the law of arrests actually required it. 
In his illustration of the rule of law in action, Hall understood the police making 
warrantless arrests as following a legal command rather than using discretion in 
determining whether a warrantless arrest in a given situation would be reasona-
ble.
169
 To account for the discretion that he could not name, Hall relied on met-
aphor. It was here that he wrote of the law-abiding officer as becoming “the liv-
ing embodiment of democratic law” and “the concrete distillation of the entire 
mighty, historic corpus juris, representing all of it, including the constitution 
itself.”
170
 To show how the felony rule of warrantless arrests constrained police 
action, Hall ended up with the discretion-wielding police officer as the personi-
ﬁcation of the rule of law. Figures of speech enabled a skeptic of the modern 
administrative state to wield the rule-of-law critique against bureaucratic man-
agement and, at the same time, understand police discretion to be consistent 
with the rule of law. 
i i i .  due process  
Another way to align police discretion with the rule of law was to modify the 
concept of rule of law. Without explanation (again), Hall’s deﬁnition of demo-
cratic policing changed (again). The rule of law as the absence of discretion be-
came the rule of law as due process—a shift from substance to procedure that 
occurred within a few paragraphs in the second lecture. One could interpret this 
conﬂation of concepts as intentional—that Hall meant, similar to Jeremy Wal-
dron’s more recent exposition, that due process serves to manage state power, 
 
169. This is a curious oversight on Hall’s part. After the Supreme Court established the automobile 
exception in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), legal commentators at the time criti-
cized the opinion for giving “discretionary carte blanche” to patrolling officers. Robert Post, 
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the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 136 (2006) (quoting Comment, Search and Sei-
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CALIF. L. REV. 351, 352 (1925)). The automobile exception, just like the felony-arrest exception, 
authorized warrantless car stops and searches if officers have “reasonable or probable cause 
for believing” that the car has contraband. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 155-56. It is difficult to under-
stand why, after about three decades, Hall failed to recognize warrantless searches and seizures 
as inherently discretionary acts. Perhaps, as this Essay argues, the cultural and political im-
perative to distinguish American police from discretion-wielding dictatorial police was so 
powerful as to erase the discretion of arresting officers. 
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which, in turn, ensures that that power conforms to the rule of law.
171
 Hall cer-
tainly detected a connection between the “procedural” aspect of due process and 
the “substantive” manifestation of the rule of law. But his articulation of the pri-
mary purpose of due process in the police context is different from our current 
understanding of due process, which emphasizes judicial management of the 
police’s power. In fact, Hall’s idea of due process had little to do with placing 
limits on routine, discretionary policing.  
According to Hall, due process included “the presumption of innocence, no-
tice and opportunity to prepare, speciﬁcity of the indictment, right to counsel, 
unbiased judge, and change of venue.”
172
 It may be puzzling, in the post-Warren 
Court era, that Hall listed trial procedures in a discussion about policing. But he 
saw the “fair trial” as integral to democratic police under the rule of law. “[S]o 
long as the police in a democratic society obey the law,” he maintained, “they do 
not decide that an arrestee is guilty of any crime.”
173
 In other words, due process 
ensured that the police did not determine individual guilt, a duty that fell strictly 
within the judicial domain. He granted that the police were the officials who in-
itiated the criminal process with an arrest, but he was ﬁrm that any police action 
had to be followed by “a prompt, fair trial,” which prevented “our police” from 
turning into “a Praetorian Guard available to some would-be Caesar.”
174
 A hear-
ing in court represented the “sharp demarcation of the police job from judicial 
functions, and the restriction of police to the so-called ministerial work.”
175
 This 
separation of powers was necessary because it was “the dictatorial police who sit 
as judges, decide cases, and enforce their decisions.” The most important point 
for Hall was that a free society with the rule of law maintained the separation of 
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It was precisely this perspective that motivated the American Bar Founda-
tion’s police study in the 1950s. Reports of widespread nonenforcement of 
crimes suggested that individual officers had taken upon themselves the roles of 
judge and jury when deciding to forgo arrest even though a crime had been com-
mitted.
177
 This understanding of the limits of policing also informed the ACLU’s 
argument in 1938 that the “most fundamental right” in the United States was 
“the right to be arrested.”
178
 In challenging Jersey City police’s refusal to arrest 
strikers, lawyer Arthur Garﬁeld Hays explained that “courts mean nothing, jury 
trials mean nothing, indictments mean nothing, a writ of habeas corpus means 
nothing, if the police don’t arrest you.”
179
 When the police decided that laborers 
were not striking but merely creating a disturbance and, accordingly, put them 
on buses to New York instead of making arrests, then the police were “acting as 
judges.”
180
 To convince the judge of the foundational principle that “[p]olice-
men are never judges,” Hays submitted rhetorically, “Certainly that is a good 
Americanism, isn’t it?”
181
 The trial judge hearing the ACLU’s application for an 
injunction showed his hand when he informed the city’s counsel that the police 
were “avoiding a judicial determination” of “the question whether there is a 
strike.”
182
 A fundamental right to be arrested certainly sounds foreign today, 
when the decision not to make an arrest—the ﬁrst entry in a criminal record that 
has lifelong ramiﬁcations—can be seen as the more rights-preserving course of 
action.
183
 But at midcentury, an arrest was just as important as the trial following 
it to maintain the “distinctions between the functions of the judge and that of 
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Signiﬁcantly, for Hall, the separation of functions seemed paramount over 
any substantive limits on police action.
185
 To be sure, Hall believed that the po-
lice themselves had to obey all laws. He recognized that police lawlessness was 
“a very serious matter in a democratic society,” and he was concerned that only 
a handful of lawsuits were ﬁled against the police each year, compared to the 
several million cases that could be brought.
186
 This suggested that damage 
claims—at the time, the only viable remedy for violations of individual 
rights
187
—hardly deterred the police from violating the law. Hall also acknowl-
edged that minorities and the poor were typically the ones who suffered from 
lawless policing. As disconcerting as these trends were, Hall nonetheless asserted 
that “[m]ore serious than the millions of illegal arrests that occur annually” were 
“illegal imprisonments and releases without judicial determination.”
188
 In other 
words, the main problem with unlawful arrests was not recurring police lawless-
ness, not the lack of adequate remedies that could encourage lawfulness, and not 
even that most of the people who were unlawfully arrested were minorities or 
poor or both. The greatest problem, according to Hall, was the fact that the po-
lice were the ones determining the ﬁnal outcomes of their actions. 
Hall’s proposals to address police lawlessness further indicated that he had 
little issue with police authority as then exercised. Illegal arrests and detentions 
were not “vicious or brutal,” he claimed, but were “well motivated and [served] 
a social need,” namely, dealing with “vagrants, drunkards, and derelicts.”
189
 Hall 
also expressed worry that efforts to make an officer “pay from his personal estate 
for acts done in the conscientious discharge of his duties” would only make him 
“feel aggrieved” and injure police morale.
190
 Because “the present police practice, 
crude as it is, can hardly be abandoned” given the social value of preventing 
crime and imposing order, Hall suggested that potential lawsuits “can be avoided 
 
185. The importance of separating the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions had purchase be-
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the yale law journal 128:1246  2019 
1282 
by requiring waivers to be signed on release from prison.”
191
 Hall did believe 
that a better option existed than having individuals sign away their legal rights. 
Having a different agency, separate from the police department, deal with 
drunks and derelicts would “drastically” reduce the number of illegal arrests and 
detentions.
192
 That way, the task of providing prompt judicial hearings “would 
begin to assume manageable proportions.”
193
 
Because Hall appreciated what he called “preventive justice,” or what we 
would recognize today as discretionary policing, his preferred solution to the 
problem of police unlawfulness was legal reform to “enlarg[e] the right of ar-
rest,” which would “eliminate vast numbers of presently illegal arrests and de-
tentions.”
194
 As Hall explained, in their efforts to investigate suspicious charac-
ters or circumstances, the police often questioned individuals and frisked them. 
But these actions involved a short detention, technically an arrest under the com-
mon law, which required the police to have probable cause rather than mere sus-
picion. By deﬁnition, then, proactive policing violated the common law of ar-
rests. Even more problematically, according to Hall, the “archaic law of arrest 
encourages policemen to use wide powers, not provided for by law—so that in-
stead of being police officers they must make decisions and discharge functions 
that are legislative, judicial, and administrative.”
195
 This occurred when, to get 
around the “archaic law,” police officers had to arrest suspicious persons to ask a 
few questions and then release them upon conﬁrming their innocence. To correct 
this situation, Hall endorsed the adoption of the 1942 Uniform Arrest Act, which 
authorized police practices that violated the common law.
196
 It did so by deﬁning 
stops, frisks, and police questioning not as arrests, and then lowering the stand-
ard that the police had to meet to justify those actions, from probable cause to 
reasonable suspicion.
197
 Legalizing presently illegal police practices not only 
solved the rule-of-law problem of police lawlessness, but it also eliminated the 
due process problem of limited judicial resources in disposing of false positive 
cases inherent in proactive policing. In sum, Hall’s understanding of policing 
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constrained by the rule of law entailed a commitment to judicial procedures that 
depended on an expansion of the scope of lawful police action. 
iv.  the american way  
While Hall struggled to apply his theory in the real world of discretionary 
policing, judges confronted the tension between the rule of law and the mandate 
of security in actual cases. Like Hall, they resolved that tension by justifying the 
police’s discretionary actions within their understanding of due process and the 
rule of law. A typical example is Brinegar v. State, a case that began in 1952 when 
two Oklahoma State highway patrolmen pulled over Virgil Brinegar for passing 
in a no-passing zone. The facts strongly suggested, however, that they had 
stopped him because he was a known “habitual whiskey runner” in a state that 
had remained steadfastly dry.
198
 During the stop for the alleged traffic violation, 
the officers searched the glove compartment and found an opened half-pint bot-
tle of liquor. They also wanted to search the trunk, but Brinegar claimed not to 
have the key with him. So the officers arrested him and put him in jail. The fol-
lowing morning, without getting a warrant, they impounded the car and pried 
the trunk open, which, as they expected, contained liquor. By the time Brinegar’s 
case reached Oklahoma’s highest criminal appeals court, the issue centered on 
whether the police could search the trunk of a car as part of an arrest for a minor 
traffic violation that had nothing to do with liquor and even may have been, the 
court acknowledged, “a subterfuge for a search.”
199
 The judges found themselves 
in a predicament. Clearly, the officers did not act within legal constraints, but 
their suspicions were right that Brinegar was rum running. How could they af-
ﬁrm the guilty man’s conviction and uphold the rule of law? 
The court’s legal analysis began by affirming “the principle of the strict up-
holding” of the Fourth Amendment, which was “necessary to the preservation 
of the American Way of Life.”
200
 At midcentury, “the American Way of Life” re-
ferred to a distinct national culture encompassing political, social, and economic 
values held to be the opposite of unfree, nondemocratic states. Historians have 
examined some of its key tenets, such as mass consumption and free enterprise, 
which many believed provided the basis for individual freedom.
201
 In referring 
to the American Way in a Fourth Amendment case, the Oklahoma court included 
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police adherence to the law as an essential component of personal liberty. The 
“strict upholding” of the constitutional provision that most directly regulated 
policing would ensure that law enforcement officers used their authority within 
the bounds of law. 
Moving on from the general rule-of-law principle, the court then attempted 
to discern the most applicable precedent from scores of cases, both state and fed-
eral. None had an identical set of facts, but all involved a police stop and search 
of a car. “The lesson to be learned from the cases,” the court discovered, boiled 
down to one question: “Was it reasonable?”
202
 The reasonableness standard in-
trinsic to Hall’s illustration of the warrant exception was, in fact, ingrained in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Like Hall’s rule-of-law ﬂowchart, the Okla-
homa court began with a constitutional principle, then proceeded to judicial de-
cisions, and ended with the standard of reasonableness. Unlike Hall, the court 
actually had to apply the standard to a speciﬁc case. “The great problem,” the 
court noted, “has always been in the application of the rule,” which revealed even 
more tensions in the concept of rule of law.
203
 
Despite their lack of sympathy for Brinegar’s “habit of violating with impu-
nity that very constitution for which he now expresses so great concern,” the 
judges believed that a stop for a minor traffic violation could not justify an un-
related search of the trunk.
204
 Nonetheless, the court found a way to conclude 
that in this particular instance, such a search had been reasonable: the “accused’s 
downfall here was having the liquor in a place convenient for rapid procurement 
and use of ﬁrearms or other weapons.”
205
 Because officers were entitled to search 
a person and his immediate surroundings for weapons as a safety precaution, the 
glove compartment, which was within Brinegar’s reaching distance, was search-
able. The whiskey found there “opened the gate for a quest otherwise barred.”
206
 
The rationalization of the officers’ actions demonstrated the usefulness of the 
reasonableness standard. The Brinegar opinion recited Fourth Amendment boil-
erplate that “each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances” and, 
therefore, “[t]here is no formula for the determination of reasonableness.”
207
 
These incantations presented an astounding articulation of the legal standard for 
policing under the rule of law. Having “no formula” meant that the Fourth 
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democratic policing before the due process revolution 
1285 
Amendment did not advance preestablished, general rules to guide police offic-
ers in performing their duties. Instead, whether a police officer acted reasonably, 
and thus lawfully, was a question that judges would determine after the fact on 
a case-by-case basis. The reasonableness standard essentially allowed courts to 
decide in each case whether to let the police do their job, even when they ap-
peared to violate constitutional norms.
208
 Though mindful of the rule-of-law is-
sues at stake, the court in Brinegar’s case concluded that the police, solely be-
cause of the suspect’s reputation for hauling liquor, could stop a driver for a 
fabricated traffic violation in order to search the trunk for contraband. The 
Brinegar court believed it had given the defendant due process of law. But its 
“strict upholding” of the Fourth Amendment did not manifest an antidiscretion 
norm; it served as a discretion-justifying principle. 
Abel v. United States raised far higher stakes for both American security and 
American criminal procedure. The case began in 1953 when a newsboy found a 
hollowed-out nickel containing a microphotograph of a coded message.
209
 After 
the defection of a dissolute Russian intelligence officer who sensed his usefulness 
to Moscow coming to an end, FBI agents learned the identity of the head of the 
Soviet spy network in North America, Rudolf Ivanovich Abel.
210
 The FBI then 
recruited the Immigration and Naturalization Service to obtain an administra-
tive arrest warrant for the purpose of commencing deportation proceedings 
against Abel. With that warrant, officers from both agencies stormed Abel’s ho-
tel room and carted off all of its contents—“a classic example of the kind of thing 
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution was designed to end in America,” 
his lawyer James Donovan argued.
211
 Donovan charged that the administrative 
warrant served as a “subterfuge” to allow the FBI to gather evidence for the es-
pionage charge without getting a regular warrant subject to Fourth Amendment 
requirements.
212
 Prosecuting Abel for crimes, including a crime punishable by 
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210. DONOVAN, supra note 209, at 2. 
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death, based on spy paraphernalia found in the room would “pay lip service to 
due process of law,” Donovan maintained.
213
 
Notwithstanding Donovan’s conclusion that the FBI had “unquestionably 
violated the United States Constitution” and despite his formidable legal skills—
he was a Harvard-educated trial lawyer, a Nuremberg prosecutor, and once the 
General Counsel of the Office of Strategic Services—Donovan lost at every 
step.
214
 He raised the Fourth Amendment issue in two federal district courts and 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Supreme Court was his last 
resort. In 1959, Donovan declared before the Justices that “the only place that 
criminal procedures have been based on such a process have been in the police 
states of Nazi Germany [and] Soviet Russia.”
215
 For the ﬁnal time, a court of law 
rejected Donovan’s plea on behalf of Colonel Abel. The majority found no prob-
lems with the cooperation of two separate agencies so long as there was no evi-
dence of bad faith, and they did not ﬁnd any. After all, they pointed out, Do-
novan conceded that Abel had been in the country illegally. 
After the Supreme Court handed down its decision, Donovan immediately 
issued a statement declaring that the “very fact that Abel has been receiving due 
process of law in the United States is far more signiﬁcant . . . than the particular 
outcome of the case.”
216
 He believed simultaneously that Abel’s Fourth Amend-
ment rights had been violated and that Abel had received the full beneﬁts of due 
process. For Donovan, due process did not necessarily mandate the right legal 
outcome. In fact, the understanding that due process was not intended primarily 
to achieve just results did not appear to be an exceptional position. When, in 
1955, McGeorge Bundy, Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard, 
offered A Lay View of Due Process, he conceived of it “not as a handsome device 
for ensuring justice, but as a blunt instrument for the prevention or avoidance 
of the most serious forms of unfairness.”
217
 Dean Bundy asserted that 
“[v]erdicts, in such a view, need not be right; they need only be, on the average, 
 
213. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212, at 13. 
214. Dr. James B. Donovan, 53, Dies; Lawyer Arranged Spy Exchange, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 1970), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1970/01/20/archives/dr-james-b-donovan-53-dies-lawyer 
-arranged-spy-exchange-president.html [https://perma.cc/HP79-5BHJ]; see also DONOVAN, 
supra note 209, at 55. 
215. Oral Argument at 1:04:53, Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (No. 2), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1959/2. 
216. DONOVAN, supra note 209, at 339. 
217. McGeorge Bundy, A Law View of Due Process, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW, supra note 108, at 
374. 
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If due process did not require correct verdicts or correct rulings, then what 
was it for? The context of Hall’s lectures and the Brinegar and Abel cases offers 
an explanation. All took place during the most paranoid spell of the Cold War. 
During Abel’s trial, a friend encouraged Donovan by reminding him of his 
“chance to demonstrate American justice at its ﬁnest to all the world and to 
Abel’s Russian masters.”
219
 These claims of supremacy became increasingly 
common during the Cold War, which involved multiple arenas of competition, 
from territorial dominance to scientiﬁc progress. At the core of them all, at least 
from the Americans’ perspective, was an ideological contest between govern-
ment by the people and the total rule of a dictator, whether fascist, socialist, or 
communist. This rivalry measured not only economic ﬂourishing and equality 
before the law
220
 but also the rights of individuals in the criminal justice system. 
These, Donovan maintained, were “our strongest defensive weapon” against the 
forces of totalitarianism.
221
 A “ﬁrm belief in the truths of freedom that led our 
ancestors to migrate to this land,” he declared, would prove much stronger than 
“our stockpile of atomic bombs” or the “development of poison gas or lethal 
rays.”
222
 Associating due process with American values became a recurring 
theme in Donovan’s legal strategy. To his client, he repeatedly intoned that he 
would “beneﬁt from the American trait of fair play.”
223
 To the jurors, the lawyer 
emphatically called on them to uphold “the tradition of a fair American trial.”
224
 
To the public, Donovan carefully reminded them of “our principles . . . engraved 
in the history and the law of the land.”
225
 Claiming due process as distinctly 
American was essentially a comparative claim. 
Fortuitously, the opportunity to compare the rival systems side by side came 
shortly after Abel’s trial, when the Soviet Union tried and convicted CIA pilot 
 
218. Id. at 366. 
219. DONOVAN, supra note 209, at 26 (quoting a letter from Ray Murphy). 
220. On economic ﬂourishing, see generally HAYEK, supra note 115. On equality and nondiscrimi-
nation, see generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS (2000). 
221. DONOVAN, supra note 209, at 310. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at 28; see also id. at 16 (“I told him that he should have conﬁdence in the basic American 
devotion to fair play.”). 
224. Id. at 124; see also id. at 231 (“It is terribly important in this particular trial that you have a clear 
concept of the function of the jury in America. We believe that our trial-by-jury system is the 
best system ever devised for arriving at the truth.”). 
225. Id. at 64. 
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Francis Gary Powers for the exact same charge: spying. On May Day 1960, Pow-
ers was captured when his U-2 spy plane, which the Russians referred to as the 
“Black Lady of Espionage,” crashed during a covert mission to take aerial pho-
tographs of Russian missile sites.
226
 Donovan used the occasion to offer his 
thoughts on the differences between the American and Soviet criminal justice 
systems. In the United States, procedural rights were “well designed to achieve 
abstract justice,” a concept that Donovan did not deﬁne.
227
 Soviet laws, in cases 
that did not affect the security of the state, also provided “a reasonable at-
tempt . . . to achieve abstract justice.” But the difference arose in cases that in-
volved state security. In Russia, such cases were “given a value transcending the 
natural and constitutional rights which a defendant always has in a free soci-
ety.”
228
 Absolute dictatorships “suppressed or obliterated” “human rights” in 




Even if Donovan was right that manifest differences existed between Soviet 
trials and American ones, he missed or ignored obvious similarities between the 
two cases. Abel certainly received a trial, perhaps even a fair one in his lawyer’s 
estimation. Still, how different were the proceedings in Abel’s case in the United 
States from Powers’s trial in the Soviet Union, when Donovan maintained that 
the “seizure of Abel and all his effects at the Hotel Latham unquestionably violated 
the United States Constitution”?
230
 Donovan argued before the Supreme Court 
that by “the use of the evidence obtained in this manner, through this illegal 
search and seizure[,] . . . this man has been convicted of a capital crime.”
231
 And 
Abel lost! To be sure, Justice Frankfurter’s opinion for the Court insisted that 
“the nature of the case, the fact that it was a prosecution for espionage, ha[d] no 
bearing whatever upon the legal considerations.”
232
 But Justice Douglas saw 
through the disclaimer, pointing out that “[c]ases of notorious criminals . . . are 




226. Id. at 348-49. 
227. Id. at 356. 
228. Id.; see also PURCELL, supra note 105, at 135-37 (describing the midcentury American under-
standing of totalitarianism). 
229. DONOVAN, supra note 209, at 356. 
230. Id. at 55 (emphasis added); see also id. at 343 (“The Fourth Amendment was the very heart of 
the search-and-seizure question and there never was any doubt that the constitutional pro-
tection applied to aliens, as well as every citizen.”). 
231. Id. at 308. 
232. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1960). 
233. Id. at 241 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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Certainly, there was a contingent of the American public that, like Douglas, 
was not so credulous. An editorial in the Washington Post observed that “[i]t 
would be ironic indeed if the Court had jeopardized” the “decent privacy of 
American homes” against unreasonable searches “in upholding the methods 
used to convict a Soviet spy.”
234
 The author had apparently read the dissenting 
opinion, which charged that “the administrative officer who invades the privacy 
of the home may be only a front for the police who are thus saved the nuisance 
of getting a warrant.”
235
 Justice Douglas could have been describing the decision 
in Brinegar as much as the decision in Abel in writing that “[w]hen guilt perme-
ates a record, even judges sometimes relax and let the police take shortcuts not 
sanctioned by constitutional procedures.”
236
 Nevertheless, these views were in 
the minority. 
The justiﬁcations of all the jurists who ruled against Abel demonstrated that, 
even in the United States, national security interests could override a defendant’s 
constitutional rights. The trial court stated at Abel’s sentencing hearing that the 
laws that the convicted spy had violated were “enacted by Congress for the pro-
tection of the American people and our way of life.”
237
 The judge certainly did 
not have judicial oversight of policing in mind—as we understand the purpose 
of criminal procedures today—when he informed Donovan that “it is the job of 
the F.B.I. to bring to light information concerning violations of the law and [that 
he did not] think [that] it is part of the Court’s duty to tell them how they should 
function.”
238
 Donovan’s argument for excluding evidence, the judge asserted, 
was an “extreme attitude.”
239
 Others shared the judge’s view. One lawyer who 
previewed the defense’s affidavit on the Fourth Amendment issue “denounced 
the entire document and said that to present such ‘lurid’ material in open court 
would smear the FBI.”
240
 This lawyer prioritized security not only over the 
Fourth Amendment guarantee but also over an open hearing. Editorials, if they 
can serve as a barometer of public opinion, suggested that many Americans 
agreed with the Supreme Court’s decision. “In protecting the life of a great na-
tion against Communism,” one commentator insisted, “officers cannot be ex-
pected to be too technical.”
241
 “If they had waited to get a search warrant they 
 
234. Editorial, Writ of Assistance, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1960, at A16. 
235. Abel, 362 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
236. Id. at 241-42. 
237. Transcript of Record at 828-29, Abel, 362 U.S. 217 (No. 2). 
238. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212, at 13. 
239. DONOVAN, supra note 209, at 110. 
240. Id. at 58. 
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might not have secured the evidence to convict the spy.”
242
 Another cautioned 
that it was “a dangerous situation indeed when a Soviet spy apprehended with 
the materials of his trade in his possession[] can almost be freed on a technical-
ity.”
243
 American procedures, it turned out, were not too stringent to hinder the 
FBI’s efforts to protect the nation from communism. 
Even though the weight of opinion fell against him on the Fourth Amend-
ment issue, Donovan still believed that his Russian client had received due pro-
cess of law. Abel and Powers received the same substantive outcome, but for Do-
novan, the mere existence of due process made all the difference between liberty 
and oppression. A fair trial was sufficient for American freedom. The result did 
not matter because the point of due process—the cultural work that it did—was 
to differentiate the United States from the Soviet Union. In this light, Donovan 
was not so different from his editorializing peers. Even as newspaper columnists 
breathed a collective sigh of relief that procedural technicalities had not been so 
rigid as to set the Russian spy free, they still deemed the entire proceeding an 
exemplar of the strength of American due process. The Abel case, one paper ex-
ulted, “jibes precisely with the hallowed American principle that every malefac-
tor—not excepting Communists spies—is entitled to a day in court.”
244
 Even 
Chief Justice Warren, who dissented in the case, later spoke in praise of the fact 
that Abel had been “accorded a full civilian trial.”
245
 But when a conviction at the 
conclusion of trial seemed foreordained, as Abel believed all along, the pageantry 
of due process became a symbolic gesture, masking any similarities between the 
United States and foreign regimes abroad, even for sophisticated legal minds. 
When confronted with aggressive policing to the point of lawlessness, jurists 
and mainstream Americans alike found reassurance in the idea of due process 
instead of questioning the extent of their reliance on the police or the FBI. Hall’s 
explication of democratic policing and Donovan’s evaluation of the Supreme 
Court’s decision had little to do with the need to place substantive limits on law 
enforcement. To be sure, Hall and Donovan believed that the United States had 
the rule of law. But when the legalist understanding of the rule of law had to give 
way to the realities of twentieth-century policing, the meaning of the rule of law 
changed from an antidiscretion principle to a due process ideal. Due process con-
veyed the meaning that even if individuals in the United States were not free 




244. Id. at 33 (quoting an editorial in the San Francisco Chronicle). 
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v. prelude to the due process revolution  
The Warren Court upheld Colonel Abel’s conviction in 1960, one year before 
it launched the Due Process Revolution. The use of due process to rationalize 
police discretion preceded the Supreme Court cases we have long celebrated for 
limiting police discretion. In 1961, the Court in Mapp v. Ohio
246
 incorporated the 
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule against the states, which, according to 
conventional accounts,
247
 spawned countless constitutional challenges and 
placed judges in the role of reviewing even the most routine police actions. One 
possible way to distinguish Abel from Mapp and its progeny may be on the basis 
of the national security concerns underlying the spy case. But explaining away 
Abel as an outlier does not help to account for other cases at the peak of the Due 
Process Revolution that also came down against criminal defendants.
248
 
A different understanding of due process, that of midcentury Americans, 
may reﬁne our perspective of the Court’s revolutionary years. It may be that the 
Court intended not simply to limit police action, but to allow it so long as officers 
did not encroach on judicial functions. The three cases that occupy the pantheon 
of the Revolution—Mapp v. Ohio in 1961,
249
 Gideon v. Wainwright in 1963,
250
 and 
Miranda v. Arizona in 1966
251
—all forged new rights in ways that preserved the 
separation of magisterial and law enforcement roles. Moreover, Terry v. Ohio, 
decided in 1968,
 252
 and Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, decided in 1972,
253
 
show that when the Supreme Court wanted to enable discretionary policing 
within rule-of-law constraints, it did so by applying the standard of reasonable-
ness—just as Hall did in his illustration of the rule of law in action. In this light, 
all of these cases indicate more continuity from the 1950s through the early 1970s 
than we have previously recognized. 
Just as signiﬁcantly, the specter of totalitarianism lurked in the cases as well, 
demonstrating that the Cold War imperative of distinguishing American justice 
 
246. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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view of the government’s power to employ undercover agents). 
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252. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
253. 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
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from dictatorial regimes also shaped Supreme Court doctrine.
254
 In Gideon, for 
instance, the Court declared that “[t]he right of one charged with crime to coun-
sel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, 
but it is in ours.”
255
 Even more pointedly, the Papachristou opinion asserted that 
vague vagrancy laws, “though long common in Russia, are not compatible with 
our constitutional system.”
256
 These references to totalitarian states abroad 
strongly suggest that the Due Process Revolution was not just a legal movement 
to reform policing. Reexamining these well-known cases as a cultural project of 
a piece with Hall’s 1952 lectures may help us see more clearly how a democratic 
theory that accommodated discretionary policing informed the Warren Court’s 
constitutional interpretations. 
Hall believed that a “prompt, fair trial” administered by judge or jury, not 
the police, was crucial to democracy.
257
 So did the Warren Court, which con-
nected this democratic necessity to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Ac-
cordingly, in Gideon the Court required states to appoint lawyers for indigent 
defendants, explaining that “any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire 
a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”
258
 One 
could analyze this radical move in purely doctrinal terms, as part of the 
longstanding debate on incorporation. On one side, Justice Frankfurter argued 
that the government provision of counsel to poor defendants was not “so funda-
mental and essential to a fair trial, and so, to due process of law.”
259
 On the other, 
Justice Black, who wrote the Gideon majority opinion, maintained that due pro-
cess required it because of “the fundamental nature of original Bill of Rights 
guarantees.”
260
 From a doctrinal point of view, a disagreement about the legal 
interpretation of due process lay at the heart of this debate—a dispute that Black 
ultimately won with respect to the right to counsel. 
But it is also possible to place Frankfurter and Black within the same legal 
culture. Whether Frankfurter looked to “those canons of decency and fairness 
which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples,”
261
 or Black to 
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the ﬁrst eight amendments to argue that “the people of no nation can lose their 
liberty so long as a Bill of Rights like ours survives,” their interpretations of due 
process were grounded in Anglo-American history, tradition, and ideas.
262
 Their 
culture was the same, though it encompassed divergent legal arguments. Al-
though at odds on a technical matter of law, the Justices were united in their 
partiality to the American adversarial trial, especially during the Cold War.
263
 
This context has informed several legal scholars’ explanations for why jurists, 
even elite members of the bar, supported the provision of counsel to indigent 
defendants.
264
 The mandate to demonstrate the superiority of the American sys-
tem over Soviet show trials also explains why Gideon proved uncontroversial 
among the American public as well. 
The signiﬁcance of a fair trial also informed the Justices’ views on the limits 
of policing. The Warren Court’s most doctrinally innovative decision, Miranda 
v. Arizona, sought to manage how police conducted interrogations by requiring 
the exclusion of statements if the police failed to inform the suspect of the rights 
to remain silent and to have a lawyer present during questioning.
265
 The judicial 
creativity employed to tether the Miranda right to the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments provoked immediate backlash. Two years later, Congress passed the Om-
nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, which explicitly sought to overrule 
Miranda.
266
 That the Court took such bold interpretative steps to protect indi-
viduals from coercive interrogation tactics is understandable, and has been un-
derstood, as a measure against police abuse and torture. Language in the opinion 
provides ample support for this explanation. For instance, the Court declared 
that “[e]ven without employing brutality, the ‘third degree’ or [psychological] 
stratagems . . . , the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on in-
dividual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.”
267
 
But the need to curb coercion was not the only reason for the Warren Court’s 
Miranda decision. After all, although the Court concluded that in-custodial in-
terrogations contain “inherently compelling pressures” even without physical in-
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timidation, Miranda did not abolish the practice or enumerate the coercive prac-
tices short of brutality or psychological manipulation that would also violate due 
process.
268
 In fact, the opinion affirmed that “[c]onfessions remain a proper el-
ement in law enforcement” and insisted that its decision was “not intended to 
hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime.”
269
 
The Court’s procedural remedy—establishing a right to counsel during 
questioning—suggests that the Miranda rule served an additional purpose. The 
opinion noted the possibility that the “most compelling possible evidence of 
guilt, a confession, would have already been obtained at the unsupervised pleas-
ure of the police.”
270
 In other words, Miranda extended the right to counsel out-
side the courtroom and into the station house because, without such assistance, 
an officer’s heavy-handed tactics to extract a confession might effectively seal a 
defendant’s fate and render a trial moot.
271
 This would dissolve the “distinctions 
between the functions of the judge and that of the policeman” that Hall had in-
sisted were basic to a democracy.
272
 Most Americans did not appreciate the Mi-
randa right’s connection to a fair trial. For them, the decision seemed to serve as 
a constraint on effective law enforcement, which explains why Miranda did not 
enjoy Gideon’s popularity. But the Court made the connection explicit in its opin-
ion. For the Justices, having counsel present during interrogations not only of-
fered a way to allow police interrogations to continue; it also ensured that a fair 
trial, not the police’s wiles, would determine the question of guilt. 
A similar logic also appeared in Mapp v. Ohio, the case that started the Due 
Process Revolution. To justify incorporating the Fourth Amendment’s exclu-
sionary rule, the opinion asked rhetorically that if coerced confessions were ex-
cluded “without regard to [their] reliability,” then “[w]hy should not the same 
rule apply to what is tantamount to coerced testimony by way of unconstitu-
tional seizure of goods, papers, effect, documents, etc.?”
273
 The reliability of 
physical evidence was arguably harder to controvert than verbal statements 
made under coercive circumstances. Even so, the Mapp opinion suggested that 
 
268. Id. at 467. 
269. Id. at 477-78. 
270. Id. at 466 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
271. See id. at 445 (noting that confessions made during “incommunicado interrogation of indi-
viduals in a police-dominated atmosphere” were “admitted at [defendants’] trials”). 
272. Hall, supra note 2, at 155. 
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unlawful police searches and seizures came too close to undermining “a fair, pub-
lic trial.”
274
 Just as Miranda saw the progression from police questioning to trial, 
Mapp likewise linked police investigations to trial and accordingly viewed ille-
gally seized evidence as a form of compelled testimony that tainted the integrity 
of a judicially determined conviction. 
The Court did not rely solely on the “close connection” between the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendment rights to take the momentous step of incorporating the 
rule of exclusion.
275
 In Mapp, the police had searched a home without a war-
rant.
276
 The probable-cause determination for warrants and their issuance were, 
of course, long-established magisterial duties. According to Justice Jackson’s oft-
quoted explanation, the Fourth Amendment “protection consists in requiring 
that those inferences [to support a search warrant] be drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”
277
 As much as the exclusionary 
rule was intended to check police discretion, it sought to do so by ensuring that 
the police would not usurp a judicial function. 
Reexamining the Mapp decision in the light of Hall’s exposition on due pro-
cess offers a different way to understand the Justices’ views on the limits of the 
police’s power. “One of the standards of the police in a democratic society,” Hall 
explained, “is the sharp demarcation of the police job from judicial functions.”
278
 
It may have been that the Justices drew the line between legitimate and illegiti-
mate police discretion along the contours of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement. Mapp fell on the illegitimate side and demonstrated how far the 
Court was willing to go to address warrantless police action when the Constitu-
tion and the common law required that the police go see a judge ﬁrst. In fact, the 
cases that Yale Kamisar identiﬁed as prodefense opinions issued after the Due 
Process Revolution—incongruously so, Kamisar believed—all sought to 
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strengthen the warrant requirement.
279
 The Warren Court was not simply pro-
tecting individual rights; more basically, it was protecting the judge’s role. 
In situations where the judiciary’s adjudicative primacy was not at risk, par-
ticularly in the context of order maintenance, the Supreme Court proved willing 
to authorize a great deal of proactive, discretionary policing. The most promi-
nent example is Terry v. Ohio, which legitimized stop-and-frisks by adopting the 
1942 Uniform Arrest Act’s reasonableness standards, just as Hall had advocated 
in the 1950s.
280
 The “discovery” of police discretion in 1960 did not appear to 
have made a difference to the outcome of the case. Rather than requiring prob-
able cause, Terry accepted an officer’s reasonable suspicion. Given the Court’s 
adoption of the lower standard, many scholars view Terry as an about-face, a 
capitulation to the proponents of law and order.
281
 The opinion, littered with 
references to the “general interest . . . of effective crime prevention and detec-
tion,” certainly gives this impression.
282
 
But interpreting Terry as a retreat presupposes that midcentury jurists of a 
liberal stripe repudiated all forms of discretionary policing. Placing Terry within 
a longer period stretching back to Hall suggests more continuity on the part of 
the Warren Court. In justifying its decision, the Court pointed out that “we deal 
here with an entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily swift action predicated 
upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat—which historically 
has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant proce-
dure.”
283
 Throughout the opinion, the Court offered variations of the same 
theme, either by noting “the limitations of the judicial function in controlling 
the myriad daily situations in which policemen and citizens confront each other 
on the street,” or in rejecting the argument that its holding “constitute[d] an 
abdication of judicial control over” the police.
284
 That stop-and-frisks would not 
undermine the separation of judicial and law enforcement functions reassured 
the Warren Court, notwithstanding its acknowledgement that the practice 
would harm minorities more. 
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arrest in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), and imposed restrictions on the issuance of 
search warrants in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
280. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 2 n.3, 10 (1968); supra notes 194-197 and accompanying text. 
281. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 7, at 5; Jeffrey Fagan, Terry’s Original Sin, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 45 
(2016). 
282. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. 
283. Id. at 20 (emphasis added). 
284. Id. at 12. 
democratic policing before the due process revolution 
1297 
This position, rather than a step back from the Due Process Revolution’s 
heady years, was actually in line with the midcentury view that, on balance, was 
supportive of proactive policing. Even though the NAACP pleaded in its amicus 
brief in a companion case to Terry that “what the ghetto does not need is more 
stop and frisk,”
285
 the Court’s opinion nonetheless relegated the reality of race 
to a sentence and a footnote and ignored the fact that the officer in the case was 
white and two of the three suspects were black.
286
 Scholars have explained this 
slight as a consequence of political backlash to the Due Process Revolution.
287
 
But from a historical perspective, Terry was not so much a break from the Court’s 
earlier decisions. It simply fell on the legitimate side of police discretion because 
street encounters that demanded spur-of-the-moment action did not involve a 
traditionally magisterial role. 
It was no coincidence that the concept of reasonableness permeated the Terry 
opinion, which held that stop-and-frisks were reasonable, and thus justiﬁed, if 
the officer had reasonable suspicion to support it.
288
 Hall’s illustration of the rule 
of law in action had also invoked the reasonableness standard, and the common 
law had long allowed officers to forgo a warrant if they reasonably believed that 
a felony had been committed.
289
 In the police context, jurists understood reason-
ableness as a legal principle limiting police discretion when requiring a warrant 
seemed impracticable. By adopting the reasonableness standard in Terry, the 
Court believed it was placing a rule-of-law constraint on warrantless, discretion-
ary policing. 
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New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (Nos. 63, 74 & 67). 
286. Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 & n.11. 
287. See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra note 5, at 217; Willrich, supra note 5, at 217-23 (describing the transi-
tion in criminal justice from the “liberal moment” of the 1960s to the “severity revolution” 
that began in the 1970s). 
288. See, for example, the prolix holding stated in conclusion: “We merely hold today that where 
a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of 
his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is deal-
ing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior 
he identiﬁes himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the 
initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, 
he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited 
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might 
be used to assault him.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (emphasis added). 
289. See supra note 132 and accompanying text; see also CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON 
THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVIL 
AND CRIMINAL STANDPOINT 83-84 (St. Louis, F.H. Thomas Law Book Co. 1886) (setting forth 
the warrant exception for felony arrests). 
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Midcentury distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate police discretion 
also informed the Burger Court’s celebrated decision in Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville. Cultural change, after all, does not neatly align with the tenures of 
Chief Justices. Although the Court invalidated vague vagrancy laws for giving 
“unfettered discretion” to officers on the beat, it is important to note that it did 
not prohibit the criminalization of loitering and other vagrancy-like conduct.
290
 
Papachristou’s procedural remedy—requiring legislatures to be more speciﬁc 
when criminalizing conduct—raises the question of what else troubled the Jus-
tices about unlimited discretion apart from the policing of nonconformists.
291
 
Again, Hall’s explication of democratic policing provides some clues. One of 
the implications of “the sharp demarcation of the police job from judicial func-
tions,” according to Hall, was that “the police do not deﬁne or declare any gen-
eral rules of law, as do judges.”
292
 This was precisely what vague vagrancy laws 
enabled the police to do. As Justice Douglas wrote in the Court’s opinion, “Here 
the net cast [by the ordinances] is large, not to give the courts the power to pick 
and choose but to increase the arsenal of the police.”
293
 The police, in other 
words, were deﬁning the law by enforcing ambiguous laws pursuant to their 
own interpretations. Even more fundamentally problematic, these laws sub-
verted the rule of law by allowing the police to skirt the probable-cause require-
ment for arrests—“a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment standard applicable to 
the States as well as to the Federal Government,” Douglas noted.
294
 If an officer 
did not have probable cause to make an arrest for, say, larceny, then the officer 
could instead make an arrest for vagrancy. Sometimes, vagrancy laws offered a 
way to prosecute an individual for conduct that was not criminal at all, an even 
clearer-cut violation of the rule of law. An example of this is told in Laura Hil-
lenbrand’s well-known story of the famous racehorse Seabiscuit. In 1938, the 
police arrested a man who was planning to put a sponge up Seabiscuit’s nostril. 
Because there was no crime of attempted assault on a horse, the man was charged 
with vagrancy.
295
 For midcentury jurists, laws that were so vague as to permit 
the police to deﬁne what they criminalized and even to use them in contravention 
of well-established laws were anathema to a democratic society. The vagrancy 
laws at issue in Papachristou had crossed a clear line. 
 
290. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168 (1972). 
291. See GOLUBOFF, supra note 167, at 221-57, 298-332 (comprising chapters seven, “Hippies, Hippie 
Lawyers, and the Challenge of Nonconformity,” and nine, “‘Vagrancy Is No Crime’”). 
292. Hall, supra note 2, at 155. 
293. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 165. 
294. Id. at 169 (footnote omitted). 
295. LAURA HILLENBRAND, SEABISCUIT: AN AMERICAN LEGEND 161 (2001). 
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But Papachristou left room for discretionary policing, which became evident 
in its aftermath. The Florida legislature revised its vagrancy law, which still crim-
inalized loitering and prowling “under circumstances that warrant a justiﬁable 
and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property 
in the vicinity.”
296
 It was, of course, up to the beat officer to determine, in the 
ﬁrst instance, what constituted such reasonable alarm. The standard of reasona-
bleness in the new ordinance gave police the discretion to continue their crime-
prevention and order-maintenance duties, but now within the well-established 
parameters of the Anglo-American legal tradition, just as it had in the common 
law of arrest, Hall’s felony-arrest example, and Terry v. Ohio. Even Justice Doug-
las’s understanding of the rule of law, which he identiﬁed as “the great mucilage 




This Essay’s reinterpretation of the Due Process Revolution as a project to 
preserve the judicially supervised “fair trial” does not necessarily challenge 
standard narratives that point to race as an impetus for modern criminal proce-
dure.
298
 But the account offered here does help clarify the precise role that race 
played. While achieving racial justice may not have been the explicit or primary 
goal of the Supreme Court, racial injustice provided the most egregious exam-
ples of unfair trials.
299
 In American history, a fair trial came under greatest threat 
when it involved black defendants, and these cases, particularly from the Jim 
Crow South, sometimes proved difficult for even the most unsympathetic Jus-
tices to ignore. As Michael Klarman has observed, the Supreme Court in the 
1920s and 1930s permitted public school segregation, the white primary, and the 
 
296. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 856.021(1) (West 1972) (emphasis added). Florida courts upheld the con-
stitutionality of the new vagrancy statute. See State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1975); D.A. 
v. State, 471 So. 2d 147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
297. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 171. 
298. For examples of this standard narrative, see Kahan & Meares, supra note 6, at 1153, 1156-57; 
and Michael Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48 
(2000). 
299. The evidence supporting a causal connection between race and modern criminal procedure is 
circumstantial rather than direct. Although Michael Klarman argued that the constitutional 
cases in the 1920s and 1930s had “racial origins,” he never imputed to the Justices an intention 
to achieve racial justice. Indeed, he noted that the composition of the Court did not favor 
intervention in state criminal proceedings on behalf of minorities. Klarman carefully couched 
his argument that “egregious exemplars of Jim Crow justice . . . provided the occasion for the 
birth of modern criminal procedure.” Klarman, supra note 298, at 49 (emphasis added); see 
also id. at 53, 59. Similarly, in arguing that “[t]he need that gave birth to the existing criminal 
procedure regime was institutionalized racism,” Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares refer to an 
“unmistakable premise,” “assumption,” and “context.” Kahan & Meares, supra note 6, at 1153, 
1156-58. 
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poll tax, yet stretched the principle of federalism to overturn state criminal con-
victions of black defendants in four landmark cases.
300
 Klarman commented that 
“the Justices thought it was one thing to segregate and disfranchise blacks, and 
quite another to execute possibly innocent black defendants after farcical tri-
als.”
301
 Actually, the Justices were not so inconsistent in their views on race; ra-
ther, they were consistent in their commitment to ensuring that southern justice 
did not stray too far from their standards of a fair trial. These earlier criminal 
procedure cases that paved the way doctrinally for the Warren Court all involved 
fundamental defects in trial procedures: convictions obtained through mob-
dominated trials,
302
 a violation of the right to counsel,
303






These criminal procedure decisions indicate that the importance of trials pre-
dated the official start of the Cold War.
306
 While the origins of this adversarial 
culture are beyond the scope of this Essay,
307
 it is worth pointing out that even 
in the ﬁrst several decades of the twentieth century, the political imperative to 
uphold capitalist democracy against communism motivated many in the United 
States to extol the exceptionalism of the American trial. The New York Times, for 
instance, noted in 1932 that Powell v. Alabama—in which eight of nine black boys 
accused of rape were sentenced to death after a four-day trial, without having 
had an opportunity to secure and consult with legal counsel—“turned wholly 
upon ‘due process of law’” and came down to the question: “Did the convicted 
youths have a fair trial?”
308
 In addition to apprising readers of the holding, the 
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U.S. 86 (1923); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); 
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306. For an early twentieth-century articulation of trials as a fundamental principle of the rule of 
law, see JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW 33, 35 (1927), 
which notes, “nothing has been held more fundamental to the supremacy of law than the right 
of every citizen to bring the action of government officials to trial in the ordinary courts of the 
common law.” 
307. For an excellent account, see AMALIA D. KESSLER, INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: 
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308. The Scottsboro Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1932, at 20; see also JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF 
SCOTTSBORO 24-38, 85-89 (1994) (discussing the political aspects of Powell v. Alabama). 
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article also spelled out the signiﬁcance of the decision: Powell disproved the com-
munist charge that “a spirit of wicked class prejudice pervades the United States, 
and that here no justice can be had for the poor and ignorant.”
309
 The reporter 
supposed that the ruling “ought to abate the rancor of extreme radicals, while 
conﬁrming the faith of the American people in the soundness of their institu-
tions.”
310
 Lost in the news about the Supreme Court’s overturning the sham tri-
als was the manner in which the sheriff’s deputies had rounded up the nine boys, 
questioned and arrested them, and lined them up for identiﬁcation. Although 
the Warren Court was undoubtedly more sensitive to discriminatory policing 
than the Hughes Court, both displayed a similar commitment to the adversarial 
trial in analogous times, when racism was rampant in local justice systems and 
when global affairs required a demonstration of American superiority. 
From the longer perspective of legal culture, the Due Process Revolution may 
not seem so revolutionary. But perhaps what was so transformative about the 
Warren Court’s criminal procedure cases is not what the Justices intended to do, 
but rather the unintended consequences of what they did. Given what we know 
about judicial rubberstamping of warrant applications,
311
 “modern” criminal 
procedure, at least in the Fourth Amendment context,
312
 has not taken place pri-
marily in cases where the police have to get warrants. It has developed mainly in 
disputes over the reasonableness standard, in cases where individual litigants 
sought to challenge the exercise of discretion that constitutional laws actually 
countenanced. In this light, the Due Process Revolution was truly a movement 
from the ground up rather than from the top down. 
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rants . . . .” (quoting Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch Davidi-
ans: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Nat’l Sec. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform 
& Oversight, 104th Cong. 40 (1995) (statement of Dick De Guerin))); Richard Van Duizend 
et al., The Search Warrant Process: Preconceptions, Perceptions, and Practices, NAT’L INST. JUST. 3 
(1984), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/93585NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc
/SF3K-WGE3] (“[S]earch warrant applications appear to be rejected very infrequently by re-
viewing magistrates . . . .”). 
312. Although the warrant requirement applies only in the Fourth Amendment context, the rea-
sonableness standard permeates other areas of criminal procedure as well. For example, 
whether a Miranda interrogation has occurred is determined by whether a police practice is 
“reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from [a] suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 
446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (emphasis added). 
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The Warren Court Justices may not have sought revolution, but they ended 
up fomenting one in how the American people thought about criminal proce-
dural rights as individual rights. Nearly everyone, from the police and their law-
and-order advocates to reformers and activists to law professors, perceived the 
Court to be reining in the police.
313
 And it is true that the Court’s decisions did 
so in important ways. Making the police get a warrant or requiring them to give 
the Miranda warning before conducting an interrogation did place restraints on 
how the police carried out investigations. But this narrative has become so pow-
erful that it has shaped a dominant interpretation of due process as a limit on 
police discretion while obscuring the ways that due process also enabled discre-
tionary policing. Indeed, what may be most revolutionary about the Warren 
Court’s Due Process Revolution is the way that it transformed a cultural value 
into a political one. 
 
313. For a police perspective, see, for example, ADAMS, supra note 133, at 8, which notes that “[t]he 
due process provisions of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights have been interpreted by the 
various courts as controlling inﬂuences on such police procedures .” 
